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The changing of arguments and their attack relation is an intrinsic property of a variety of
argumentation systems. So, it is very important to eﬃciently ﬁgure out how the status of
arguments in a system evolves when the system is updated. However, unlike other areas
of argumentation that have been deeply explored, such as argumentation semantics, proof
theories, and algorithms, etc., dynamics of argumentation systems has been comparatively
neglected. In this paper, we formulate a general theory (called a division-based method)
to cope with this problem based on a new concept: the division of an argumentation
framework. When an argumentation framework is updated, it is divided into three parts:
an unaffected, an affected, and a conditioning part. The status of arguments in the
unaffected sub-framework remains unchanged, while the status of the affected arguments
is computed in a special argumentation framework (called a conditioned argumentation
framework, or brieﬂy CAF) that is composed of an affected part and a conditioning
part. We have proved that under a certain semantics that satisﬁes the directionality
criterion (complete, preferred, ideal, or grounded semantics), the extensions of the updated
framework are equal to the result of a combination of the extensions of an unaffected sub-
framework and sets of the extensions of a set of assigned CAFs. Due to the eﬃciency of the
division-based method, it is expected to be very useful in various kinds of argumentation
systems where arguments and attacks are dynamics.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In order to handle the uncertainty, incompleteness, and inconsistency of information, various kinds of quantitative ap-
proaches (probabilities, fuzzy rules, etc.) and qualitative ones (answer set programming, defeasible logic, and argumentation,
etc.) have been proposed. Among them, argumentation is gaining momentum in recent ﬁfteen years [30,3,12,29], with ex-
tensive research in various aspects, including semantics [62,16,8,17,9,33,10,11,52], proof theories and algorithms [22,31–34,
18,63,53], and computational complexity [28,36,25,35,37,39,38]. The key point of current research is to determine sets of
justiﬁed arguments (extensions) from a set of conﬂicting arguments. Despite the differences, they all used argumentation
frameworks that are static [13], while paying little attention to the dynamics of an argumentation system, i.e., how the
extensions of an argumentation system change with the changing of arguments and their attack relation.
The changing of arguments and their attack relation is an intrinsic property of a variety of argumentation systems [45,
12,15], especially argumentation-based autonomous agents within a dynamic environment, including belief revision [40,19,
20,61,55,42], deliberation [2,7,54,44,48], decision-making [46,43,5,6,51], and negotiation [57,47,1,59,4]. The existing research
✩ The basic idea of this paper has been introduced in Liao et al. (2010) [50].
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knowledge or information. For example, in [20,61], the authors formulated a system where an instantiated argumentation
framework is based on the changing observations. So, at each time point, when observations change, the arguments and
their attack relation change accordingly. In [40,41], within an argumentative system, when new explanation is received,
some strict rules are changed to defeasible rules, which gives rise to the changing of arguments and their attack relation.
In [48,49], due to the dynamics of observations and inference rules, the argumentation frameworks for beliefs, goals, and
intentions, respectively, are dynamic. In [59,4], argumentation-based negotiation (ABN) agents perform reasoning with in-
complete, uncertain, and inconsistent information. Each agent’s theory (as an argumentation system) may evolve during a
negotiation dialogue, i.e., if an agent receives an argument from another agent, it will add the new argument to its theory,
and furthermore, new conﬂicts may arise between the original arguments of the agent and the ones that emerge after
adding the received arguments to its theory [4]. In [27], when a collection of argumentation systems coming from different
agents are merged (after consensual expansion of each argumentation system), the arguments and the attack relation of
each argumentation system may change accordingly.
To illustrate the dynamics of argumentation systems, let us see a revised example from [20].
Example 1. There are some rules in the knowledge base of an autonomous agent for performing basic email ﬁltering, in
which r4 is superior to r5, and r7 is superior to r5:
r1: A message from the local host is usually not classiﬁed as spam.
r2: A message is usually labeled as spam if it comes from a server that is on the blacklist.
r3: A message should be moved to the “junk” folder if it is marked as spam.
r4: Unﬁltered messages in the “junk” folder usually should not be moved to the inbox.
r5: If an email does not match with any user-deﬁned ﬁlter then it usually should be moved to the “inbox” folder.
r6: A message should not be moved to the “junk” folder if it is from a VIP user.
r7: A message with viruses should not be moved to the inbox.
Based on the above rules, let us consider the following scenarios at successive time points t1, t2, t3 and t4. First, at t1,
the observations related to a message M1 show that: (1) M1 is from a local host, and (2) M1 comes from a server that is
in the blacklist. Second, at t2, a new observation “M1 does not match with any user-deﬁned ﬁlter” is added. Third, at t3, an
observation “M1 is from a VIP user” is added. Fourth, at t4, an observation “M1 contains a virus” is added. So, according to
the rules r1 ∼ r7, at different time points, we may construct the following four different argumentation frameworks (AF1,
AF2, AF3, and AF4), in which (α,β) denotes α rebuts β ,1 while 〈α,β〉 denotes α undercuts β (i.e., ∃γ ⊂ β , such that, γ
rebuts α) [49].
AF1 =
〈{α1,α2,α3},
{〈α1,α3〉, (α1,α2), (α2,α1), 〈α1,α4〉
}〉
AF2 =
〈{α1,α2,α3,α4,α5},
{〈α1,α3〉, (α1,α2), (α2,α1), 〈α1,α4〉, (α4,α5)
}〉
AF3 =
〈{α1,α2,α3,α4,α5,α6},
{〈α1,α3〉, (α1,α2), (α2,α1), 〈α1,α4〉, (α4,α5), (α3,α6), (α6,α3), 〈α6,α4〉
}〉
AF4 =
〈{α1,α2,α3,α4,α5,α6,α7},
{〈α1,α3〉, (α1,α2), (α2,α1), 〈α1,α4〉, (α4,α5), (α3,α6), (α6,α3), 〈α6,α4〉, (α7,α5)
}〉
α1 =
({r1},¬spam(M1)
)
α2 =
({r2}, spam(M1)
)
α3 =
({r2, r3},move_junk(M1)
)
α4 =
({r2, r3, r4},¬move_inbox(M1)
)
α5 =
({r5},move_inbox(M1)
)
α6 =
({r6},¬move_junk(M1)
)
α7 =
({r7},¬move_inbox(M1)
)
In Fig. 1, arguments and attacks in red are newly added, while those arguments in blue are affected by the addition
of arguments and attacks. So, the status of arguments α1, α2, α3, and α4 in AF1 remains unchanged after the addition
of arguments α5, and of attacks (α4,α5), in AF2; the status of arguments α1 and α2 in AF2 remains unchanged, while
the status of arguments α3, α4, and α5 in AF2 may be affected, after the addition of an argument α6, and of attacks
1 When the conclusions of arguments α and β are complementary, if α is superior to β , then α is a proper defeater of β , denoted as (α,β); else, α is
a blocking defeater of β , denoted as {(α,β), (β,α)}. For example, since r4 is superior to r5, the corresponding argument α4 is superior to α5. So, there is
only an attack from α4 to α5, and not vice versa.
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(α3,α6), (α6,α3), and 〈α6,α4〉, in AF3; the status of arguments α1, α2, α3, α4, and α6 in AF3 remains unchanged, while the
status of arguments α5 may be affected, after the addition of argument α7, and of the attack (α7,α5).
As shown in Example 1, when new observations arise, a set of arguments and/or attacks are added to the system.
Meanwhile, in some other cases, when observations or rules of inference change, a set of arguments and/or attacks may
be deleted from the system [49]. With the changing of arguments and/or attacks of an argumentation system, the status
of some arguments changes, while that of others remains untouched. Now, one of the challenging problems is how to
eﬃciently compute the dynamics of argumentation systems. When an argumentation system is modiﬁed, we may simply
recompute the status of each argument afresh. However, this method is obviously ineﬃcient, and in most of cases, diﬃcult.
To cope with this problem, there have been a small number of efforts [5,13,23]. First, Boella et al. studied the dynamics
of argumentation by exploring the principles according to which the extension does not change when the set of arguments
or the attacks between them are changed [13]. However, they have not considered how the extensions of an argumentation
system evolve when new arguments are added or the old ones are removed. Second, Cayrol et al. addressed the problem
of revising the set of extensions of an abstract argumentation system, and studied how the extensions of an argumentation
system may evolve when a new argument is received [23]. However, they restricted their study to the case of adding just
one argument having only one interaction with an initial argument. Third, Amgoud et al. used dynamics of argumentation
in the decision-making of an autonomous agent [5]. They studied how the acceptability of arguments evolves when the
decision system is extended by new arguments without computing the whole extensions. However, they also considered
the situation where only one argument is added to the system. In addition, all of the current efforts have not taken the
eﬃciency of computing the dynamics of argumentation into consideration.
According to the above analysis, a more general theory is needed to formulate the dynamics of an argumentation system,
with the following three characteristics:
• The number of arguments and attacks to be added to (or deleted from) an argumentation system is unlimited;
• Both the addition and the deletion of arguments and/or attacks are considered;
• The eﬃciency of computing the dynamics of argumentation systems is considered.
To realize this purpose, in this paper, we will propose a division-based method. The basic idea of this method is that
when an argumentation framework is updated, we may only recompute the status of those arguments that are affected,
while the status of those arguments that are unaffected can be obtained directly from the result of the previous com-
putation [50]. An important principle behind this method is that, under a given argumentation semantics that satisﬁes
directionality criterion [9], the status of arguments that are affected and unaffected can be computed separately and then
combined to form the extensions of the updated argumentation framework.
According to [9], the following argumentation semantics have been proved to satisfy the directionality criterion:
grounded semantics, complete semantics, preferred semantics, ideal semantics, CF2, and the prudent version of grounded
semantics. However, for simplicity, in this paper, we will only consider grounded, complete, preferred, and ideal semantics,
while CF2 that is based on the SCC-recursive scheme [8], as well as the prudent version of grounded semantics that is based
on the notion of prudently conﬂict-free set [26], are left to our future work.
This paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we will introduce some basic concepts that will be used in this
paper. Second, in Sections 3 and 4, the syntax and semantics of the dynamics of argumentation systems will be described
respectively. Finally, in Section 5, we will conclude the paper and point out some future work.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce some basic concepts that will be used in this paper: (1) Dung’s theory of abstract
argumentation frameworks, (2) the status of arguments, and (3) the directionality criterion of argumentation semantics.
Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation frameworks. In our division-based method, we will only treat with the argumentation
systems that are abstract, i.e., abstract argumentation frameworks that were introduced in [30,33].
Deﬁnition 1. An argumentation framework is a tuple AF = 〈A, R〉, where A is a set of arguments, and R ⊆ A × A is a set of
attacks.
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been mentioned in Example 1. Meanwhile, throughout this paper, we assume that A is generated by a reasoner at a given time
point, and therefore is ﬁnite.
Given an argumentation framework, a fundamental problem is to determine which arguments can be considered justiﬁed.
According to [30], extension-based argumentation semantics is a formal way to answer this question. Here, an extension
represents a set of arguments that are considered to be acceptable together, which is based on the following three important
notions: conﬂict-free, acceptability, and admissible sets.
Deﬁnition 2. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework.
• A set B ⊆ A of arguments is conﬂict-free if and only if α,β ∈ B , s.t. (α,β) ∈ R .
• An argument α ∈ A is acceptable w.r.t. a set B ⊆ A of arguments (also called α is defended by B), if and only if
∀(β,α) ∈ R , ∃γ ∈ B , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R .
• A conﬂict-free set of arguments B ⊆ A is admissible if and only if each argument in B is acceptable w.r.t. B .
With the notion of admissible set, the extensions of an argumentation framework under different argumentation seman-
tics can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework, B ⊆ A be an admissible set of arguments.
• B is a preferred extension if and only if B is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) admissible set of arguments.
• B is a complete extension if and only if each argument in A that is acceptable w.r.t. B is in B .
• B is a grounded extension if and only if B is the minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension.
• B is ideal if and only if B is admissible and it is contained in every preferred set of arguments. The ideal extension is
the maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) ideal set.
We use ECO(AF), EPR(AF), EGR(AF), and EID(AF) to denote the set of complete extensions, preferred extensions,
grounded extensions, and ideal extensions of AF , respectively. Meanwhile, for convenience, we use S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}
to denote one of the four argumentation semantics.
Status of arguments. With respect to each extension under a certain semantics S , we will differentiate three kinds of sta-
tuses of arguments: accepted, rejected, and undecided. Informally, an argument is accepted with respect to an extension, if
and only if it belongs to this extension; an argument is rejected with respect to an extension, if and only if it is attacked by
another argument that is accepted with respect to this extension; an argument is undecided with respect to an extension,
if and only if it is neither accepted nor rejected with respect to this extension. So, given a speciﬁc extension, the status
of each argument can be determined uniquely. This idea is very important to support the incremental computation of the
status of arguments in the division-based method. Let us see an example as follows.
Example 2. Let AF = 〈{α1,α2,α3}, {(α1,α2), (α2,α1), (α2,α3)}〉 be an argumentation framework, and AF1 = 〈{α1,α2},
{(α1,α2), (α2,α1)}〉 a sub-framework of AF . Since the arguments in AF1 are not attacked by the arguments outside AF1,
we may compute the extensions of AF1 independently. For instance, under complete semantics, we have ECO(AF1) =
{E1, E2, E3}, in which E1 = {α1}, E2 = {α2}, and E3 = ∅. With respect to each extension, the status of arguments in AF1
can be determined uniquely:
• With respect to E1, α1 is accepted and α2 is rejected;
• With respect to E2, α2 is accepted and α1 is rejected;
• With respect to E3, α1 and α2 are undecided.
Then, for each status assignment of α2 (which has an interaction with α3), the status of α3 can be determined accord-
ingly: when α2 is rejected, α3 is accepted; when α2 is accepted, α3 is rejected; and when α2 is undecided, α2 is also
undecided. As a result, we may obtain the set of complete extensions of AF , i.e., ECO(AF) = {{α1,α3}, {α2},∅}.
According to Example 2, it is obvious that all the three statuses of arguments are necessary,2 which make possible the
incremental computation of the status of arguments.
Based on the above analysis, we have the following deﬁnition:
2 It is necessary to differentiate undecided from rejected. Otherwise, as shown in Example 2, we may not able to differentiate situations 2 and 3 (when
the status of α2 is assigned with respect to E2 and E3, respectively). Consequently, the status of α3 cannot be assigned uniquely.
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of arguments A can be partitioned into three parts: A(AF, E), R(AF, E), and U(AF, E), where:
• A(AF, E) = E is the set of accepted arguments (w.r.t. E);
• R(AF, E) = {α ∈ A | ∃β ∈ E , s.t. (β,α) ∈ R} is the set of rejected arguments (w.r.t. E);
• U(AF, E) = A \ (A(AF, E) ∪R(AF, E)) is the set of undecided arguments (w.r.t. E).
A 3-tuple S(AF, E) = (A(AF, E),R(AF, E),U(AF, E)) is called a status assignment of an argumentation framework AF with
respect to E .
According to Deﬁnition 4, for all α ∈ A, the status of α is related to a speciﬁc extension E ∈ ES (AF). So, if the status
of α is accepted with respect to E , then it indicates that α is a member of E , but not necessary to be a member of other
extensions. Meanwhile, if the status of α is rejected with respect to E , then it indicates that α is not acceptable with respect
to E , but may be acceptable with respect to other extensions of AF .
So, the notion of status assignment with respect of a speciﬁc extension is different from the traditional notions of
justiﬁcation state of an argument: credulously justiﬁed, skeptically justiﬁed, and indefensible. However, they can be related
by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A, R〉 and a semantics S , an argument α ∈ A is credulously justiﬁed
if and only if ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α ∈ A(AF, E); it is skeptically justiﬁed if and only if ∀E ∈ ES (AF),α ∈ A(AF, E); and it is
indefensible if and only if E ∈ ES (AF) s.t. α ∈ A(AF, E).
According to Deﬁnition 5, under a certain semantics, when an argument α ∈ A is credulously justiﬁed, it is accepted
with respect to some extensions of the argumentation framework, while it may be rejected or undecided with respect to
other extensions; when α is skeptically justiﬁed, it is accepted with respect to all extensions; and when α is indefensible,
it is not accepted with respect to any extension.
Directionality criterion of argumentation semantics. As mentioned above, the division-method is based on the notion of direc-
tionality of argumentation semantics [8,9]. The basic idea of directionality is that under some argumentation semantics, the
status of an argument α is affected only by the status of its defeaters (which in turn are affected by their defeaters and so
on), while the arguments which only receive an attack from α (and in turn those which are attacked by them and so on)
do not have any effect on the status of α. The following deﬁnitions (Deﬁnitions 6–8) are borrowed from [9].
Deﬁnition 6. Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A, R〉, a set U ⊆ A is unattacked if and only if α ∈ (A \ U ), s.t. α
attacks an argument in U . The set of unattacked sets of AF is denoted as US(AF).
Deﬁnition 7. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework. The restriction of AF to S ⊆ A is the argumentation framework
AF ↓S= 〈S, R ∩ (S × S)〉.
The directionality criterion is then deﬁned by requiring an unattacked set to be unaffected by the remaining parts of the
argumentation framework as far as extensions are concerned.
Deﬁnition 8. A semantics S satisﬁes the directionality criterion if and only if ∀AF = 〈A, R〉, ∀U ∈ US(AF), AES (AF,U ) =
ES (AF ↓U ), where AES (AF,U ) =def {(E ∩ U ) | E ∈ ES (AF)} ⊆ 2U .
According to Deﬁnition 8, the intersection of any extension prescribed by S for AF with an unattacked set U is equal to
one of the extensions prescribed by S for the restriction of AF to U , and vice versa.
3. Dynamics of argumentation systems: syntax
In this section, we will deﬁne the dynamic of argumentation systems syntactically. As mentioned in Section 1, when a
set of arguments and/or a set of attacks are added to (or deleted from) an argumentation framework, the status of affected
arguments may change. However, if some arguments and attacks to be added are in the existing argumentation framework,
or some arguments and attacks to be deleted are not in the existing argumentation framework, an addition (respectively
a deletion) of them will not have any effects on the argumentation framework. So, in this paper, for simplicity and without
loss of generality, we suppose that the arguments and attacks to be added are not in the existing argumentation framework,
while the arguments and attacks to be deleted are in the existing argumentation framework.
Let Uarg be the universe of arguments. Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 9. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework, where A ⊆ Uarg and R ⊆ A × A. An addition of AF is repre-
sented as a tuple (B,IA: B ∪ IA), in which B ⊆ Uarg \ A is a set of arguments to be added, and IA: B ∪ IA is a set of attacks
B. Liao et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1790–1814 1795(also called interactions) to be added. On the other hand, a deletion of AF is also represented as a tuple (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B),
in which B ⊆ A is a set of arguments to be deleted, and IA\B: B ∪ IA\B is a set of attacks to be deleted.
In Deﬁnition 9, we borrow the notion I from [24], denoted the interactions between arguments under the context of
change in argumentation. In this paper, we extend this notion and differentiate three forms: IA: B , IA , and I(A,B) , in which:
• IA: B is the set of interactions related to B and of the form (α,β), (β,α), or (β,β ′), in which α ∈ A and β,β ′ ∈ B . In
addition, to a deletion, it holds that IA\B: B = R ∩ ((B × B) ∪ (B × (A \ B)) ∪ ((A \ B) × B)) = R ∩ ((B × A) ∪ (A × B)).
• IA is a set of interactions between the arguments in A, and of the form (α,α′), in which α,α′ ∈ A.
• I(A,B) is used and explained in Deﬁnition 11.
Based on Deﬁnition 9, an updated argumentation framework with respect to an addition or a deletion is syntactically
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 10. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework, (B,IA: B ∪ IA) be an addition and (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) be a
deletion. Syntactically, the updated AF w.r.t. (B,IA: B ∪ IA) and (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) is respectively represented as follows:
〈A, R〉 ⊕ (B,IA: B ∪ IA) =def
〈
A ∪ B, R ∪ (IA: B ∪ IA)
〉
(1)
〈A, R〉  (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) =def
〈
A \ B, R \ (IA\B: B ∪ IA\B)
〉
(2)
For simplicity, we use 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and 〈A, R〉 to denote 〈A ∪ B, R ∪ (IA: B ∪ IA)〉 and 〈A \ B, R \ (IA\B: B ∪ IA\B)〉,
respectively.
Proposition 1. Let 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and 〈A, R〉 be the result of an addition and of a deletion respectively. It holds R⊕ ⊆ A⊕ × A⊕ and
R ⊆ A × A , i.e. 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and 〈A, R〉 are argumentation frameworks.
Proof. First, according to Deﬁnition 9, in the case of addition, it holds that R ⊆ A × A, IA: B ⊆ (A × B) ∪ (B × A) ∪ (B × B),
and IA ⊆ A× A. So, we have R⊕ = R ∪ (IA: B ∪IA) ⊆ (A× A)∪ ((A× B)∪ (B × A)∪ (B × B))∪ (A× A) = (A∪ B)× (A∪ B) =
A⊕ × A⊕ . Second, in the case of deletion, it holds that IA\B: B = R ∩ ((B × B) ∪ (B × (A \ B)) ∪ ((A \ B) × B)). Therefore,
R \ IA\B: B = (R ∩ (A × A)) \ (R ∩ ((B × B) ∪ (B × (A \ B)) ∪ ((A \ B) × B))) = R ∩ ((A \ B) × (A \ B)). Meanwhile, since all
interactions in IA\B belong to R ∩ ((A \ B) × (A \ B)), it holds that (R \ IA\B: B) \ IA\B ⊆ (A \ B) × (A \ B) = A × A , i.e.,
R = R \ (IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) = (R \ IA\B: B) \ IA\B ⊆ A × A . 
4. Dynamics of argumentation systems: semantics
Now, let’s analyze respectively the semantics of an addition and a deletion to an argumentation framework, i.e., how the
extensions of an argumentation framework evolve when an addition or a deletion happens.
According to the formulas (1) and (2), with respect to a certain argumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}, we
may directly compute the extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and 〈A, R〉 afresh, without considering previous information (the ex-
tensions of AF = 〈A, R〉). However, if the previous information is properly used, the complexity of computing the dynamics
of argumentation might be decreased. According to Deﬁnition 8, if an argumentation semantics satisﬁes the criterion of
directionality, then the status of an argument α is affected only by the status of its defeaters, while the arguments which
only receive an attack from α have no effect on the state of α. Based on this idea, we may infer that when a set of argu-
ments and/or a set of attacks are added to (or deleted from) an argumentation framework, some arguments are directly or
indirectly affected, while others remain unaffected. Therefore, if we can divide 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 or 〈A, R〉 into two parts: affected
and unaffected, we need only to compute the status of affected arguments, while leaving the status of unaffected arguments
unchanged. Now, three key questions arise:
• How to divide an argumentation framework when it is updated, and make this division correct?
• How to compute the status of affected arguments (in this paper, newly added arguments are also regarded as affected
arguments) whose status might be conditioned by the status of those unaffected arguments?
• How to combine the status of unaffected arguments and that of affected ones, and make this combination sound and
complete?
In order to cope with these problems, in this section, we will ﬁrstly introduce two new concepts, conditioned argumen-
tation frameworks and the division of an argumentation framework, and then give the semantics of an addition and a deletion,
respectively, based on these concepts.
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4.1. Conditioned argumentation frameworks
In order to support the formulation of the dynamics of argumentation, i.e., to compute the status of affected arguments,
we introduce a special argumentation framework that is conditioned by an external argumentation framework. We call it
conditioned argumentation framework (CAF). The deﬁnitions and properties of a CAF are presented as follows.
4.1.1. Deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition 11. Given an argumentation framework AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉, a conditioned argumentation framework w.r.t. AF1 is a
tuple CAF = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1),I(C(A1),A2))), in which
• 〈A2, R2〉 is an argumentation framework that is conditioned by C(A1), in which A2 ∩ A1 = ∅;
• C(A1) ⊆ A1 is a nonempty set of arguments (called conditioning arguments) that have interactions with arguments in
A2, i.e., ∀α ∈ C(A1),∃β ∈ A2, s.t. (α,β) ∈ I(C(A1),A2); and• I(C(A1),A2) ⊆ C(A1)× A2 is the set of interactions from the arguments in C(A1) to the arguments in A2, and of the form
(α,β), in which α ∈ C(A1) and β ∈ A2.
In Deﬁnition 11, the status of arguments in C(A1) of a CAF is assigned within AF1, an argumentation framework inde-
pendent of 〈A2, R2〉. So, after the status of arguments in C(A1) is assigned according to a speciﬁc extension E1 ∈ ES (AF1),
we call the CAF an assigned CAF, denoted as CAF[E1] = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1)[E1],I(C(A1),A2))), in which C(A1)[E1] is a set of
arguments with assigned statuses, deﬁned as follows:
C(A1)[E1] =def
(
A(AF1, E1) ∩ C(A1),R(AF1, E1) ∩ C(A1),U(AF1, E1) ∩ C(A1)
)
(3)
In formula (3), C(A1)[E1] is also called a condition of 〈A2, R2〉. In order to further explain the above concepts, we give
the following example.
Example 3. Let AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉 be an AF, in which A1 = {α1,α2,α3,α4} and R1 = {(α1,α2), (α2,α1), (α1,α3), (α2,α3),
(α3,α4)}, and CAF1 = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1),I(C(A1),A2))) be a CAF with respect to AF1, in which A2 = {α5,α6,α7,α8,α9,
α10}, R2 = {(α5,α6), (α6,α5), (α7,α8), (α8,α7), (α5,α10), (α9,α10), (α10,α7)},C(A1) = {α2,α4}, and I(C(A1),A2) = {(α2,α5),
(α4,α9)} (Fig. 2). Under complete semantics, we have ECO(AF1) = {E1,1, E1,2, E1,3},3 in which E1,1 = {α1,α4}, E1,2 =
{α2,α4}, and E1,3 = ∅. Three status assignments of AF1 are S(AF1, E1,1) = ({α1,α4}, {α2,α3},∅), S(AF1, E1,2) = ({α2,α4},
{α1,α3},∅), and S(AF1, E1,3) = (∅,∅, {α1,α2,α3,α4}). So, there are three assigned CAFs with respect to E1,1, E1,2, and E1,3,
respectively:
CAF1[E1,1] =
(〈A2, R2〉,
(
C(A1)[E1,1],I(C(A1),A2)
))
CAF1[E1,2] =
(〈A2, R2〉,
(
C(A1)[E1,2],I(C(A1),A2)
))
CAF1[E1,3] =
(〈A2, R2〉,
(
C(A1)[E1,3],I(C(A1),A2)
))
C(A1)[E1,1] =
({α4}, {α2},∅
)
C(A1)[E1,2] =
({α2,α4},∅,∅
)
C(A1)[E1,3] =
(∅,∅, {α2,α4}
)
According to Example 3, the status of arguments in an assigned CAF is related to the status of conditioning arguments.
The semantics of an assigned CAF is deﬁned as follows:
3 For convenience and without confusion, in all subsequent examples, we use E1,i to denote an extension of the conditioning argumentation framework,
E2,i to denote an extension of the conditioned argumentation framework, and E0,i to denote an extension of the argumentation framework that does not
belong to the above two cases.
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ES (AF1),S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}.
• A set B ⊆ A2 of arguments is conﬂict-free if and only if α,β ∈ B , s.t. (α,β) ∈ R2.
• An argument α ∈ A2 is acceptable w.r.t. a set B ⊆ A2 of arguments under the condition C(A1)[E1], if and only if the
following two conditions hold:
– ∀β ∈ A2, if (β,α) ∈ R2, then ∃γ ∈ B , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R2, or ∃ξ ∈ C(A1), s.t. ξ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and (ξ,β) ∈ I(C(A1),A2);
and
– ∀β ∈ C(A1), if (β,α) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) , then β is rejected w.r.t. E1.• A conﬂict-free set B ⊆ A2 of arguments is admissible if and only if each argument in B is acceptable w.r.t. B under the
condition C(A1)[E1].
Deﬁnition 13. Let CAF[E1] = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1)[E1],I(C(A1),A2))) be an assigned CAF w.r.t. AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉, in which E1 ∈
ES (AF1),S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}. Let B ⊆ A2 be an admissible set of arguments.
• B is a preferred extension if and only if B is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) admissible set of arguments.
• B is a complete extension if and only if each argument that is acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1] is in B .
• B is a grounded extension if and only if B is the minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension.
• B is ideal if and only if B is admissible and it is contained in every preferred set of arguments. The ideal extension is
the maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) ideal set.
Example 4. According to Example 3, E1,1 = {α1,α4} and E1,2 = {α2,α4} are preferred extensions of AF1. So, we have
EPR(CAF1[E1,1]) = {E2,1, E2,2, E2,3}, EPR(CAF1[E1,2]) = {E2·4}, in which E2,1 = {α5,α7}, E2,2 = {α5,α8}, and E2,3 = E2·4 =
{α6,α8,α10}. Here, the acceptability of arguments in each assigned CAF is evaluated according to the corresponding condi-
tion. For instance, in EPR(CAF1[E1,1]):
• Argument α5 is acceptable w.r.t. E2,1 under the condition C(A1)[E1,1] in that for the only argument α6 in A2 that
attacks α5, there exists α5 in E2,1, s.t. (α5,α6) ∈ R2, and for the only argument α2 in C(A1) that attacks α5, it holds
that α2 is rejected w.r.t. E1,1;
• Meanwhile, argument α10 is acceptable w.r.t. E2,3 under the condition C(A1)[E1,1] in that for the argument α5 in A2
that attacks α10, there exists α6 in E2,3, s.t. (α6,α5) ∈ R2, while for the argument α9 in A2 that attacks α10, there
exists α4 in C(A1), s.t. α4 is accepted w.r.t. E1,1 and (α4,α9) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) .
With respect to each extension under a certain semantics S , the statuses of conditioned arguments (accepted, rejected,
and undecided) are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 14. Let CAF[E1] = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1)[E1],I(C(A1),A2))) be an assigned CAF w.r.t. AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉, in which E1 ∈
ES (AF1). Let E2 ∈ ES (CAF[E1]) be an extension.
• An argument α ∈ A2 is accepted w.r.t. E2 under the condition C(A1)[E1], if and only if α ∈ E2;
• An argument α ∈ A2 is rejected w.r.t. E2 under the condition C(A1)[E1], if and only if ∃β ∈ E2, s.t. (β,α) ∈ R2, or
∃γ ∈ E1, s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ I(C(A1),A2);• An argument α ∈ A2 is undecided w.r.t. E2 under the condition C(A1)[E1], if and only if (i) α /∈ E2, (ii) β ∈ E2 s.t.
(β,α) ∈ R2, and (iii) γ ∈ C(A1), s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) and γ ∈ E1.
Finally, the justiﬁcation state of an argument in an assigned CAF is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 15. Given CAF = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1),I(C(A1),A2))) (w.r.t. AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉) and a semantics S , an argument α ∈ A2 is
credulously justiﬁed if and only if ∃E2 ∈⋃E1∈ES (AF1) ES (CAF[E1]), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E2 under the condition C(A1)[E1];
it is skeptically justiﬁed if and only if ∀E2 ∈⋃E1∈ES (AF1) ES (CAF[E1]), α is accepted w.r.t. E2 under the condition C(A1)[E1];
and it is indefensible if and only if E2 ∈⋃E1∈ES (AF1) ES (CAF[E1]), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E2 under the condition C(A1)[E1].
4.1.2. Properties
Existence of preferred extensions. As Deﬁnitions 12 and 13 for an assigned CAF are based on the corresponding deﬁnitions
of a Dung style argumentation framework,4 it is not surprising to ﬁnd that some properties of a Dung style argumentation
framework [30] are also possessed by an assigned CAF. The following theorems and corollaries illustrate this similarity.
4 In order to differentiate an assigned CAF from the argumentation framework deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1, we call the latter Dung style argumentation frame-
work.
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B ⊆ A2 be an admissible set of arguments, and α, α′ ∈ A2 be arguments which are acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1].
Then
(i) B ′ = B ∪ {α} is admissible, and
(ii) α′ is acceptable w.r.t. B ′ under the condition C(A1)[E1].
Proof. First, since α is acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1], we need only to prove that B ′ is conﬂict-free.
Assume the contrary. Therefore, ∃β ∈ B s.t. either (α,β) ∈ R2 or (β,α) ∈ R2. From the admissibility of B and the accept-
ability of α, it holds that: (a) ∃β ′ ∈ B , s.t. (β ′, β) ∈ R2 or (β ′,α) ∈ R2; or (b) ∃γ ∈ C(A1), s.t. γ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and
(γ ,α) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) or (γ ,β) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) .
• In the ﬁrst case, since B is conﬂict-free, it holds that (β ′, β) /∈ R2, and therefore (β ′,α) ∈ R2. As a result, either ∃β ′′ ∈
B , s.t. (β ′′, β ′) ∈ R2, contradicting the admissibility of B , or ∃γ ′ ∈ C(A1), s.t. γ ′ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and (γ ′, β ′) ∈
I(C(A1),A2) . (According to the second condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF in Deﬁnition 12, β ′ is
not acceptable under the condition C(A1)[E1], i.e., β ′ is not in B , contradicting β ′ ∈ B .)
• In the second case, according to the second condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF in Deﬁnition 12,
it holds that either α or β is not acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1]. Contradiction.
Second, since the following two conditions hold, it holds that α′ is acceptable w.r.t. B ′ under the condition C(A1)[E1]:
• ∀β ∈ A2, if (β,α′) ∈ R2, then ∃γ ∈ B ′ , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R2, or ∃ξ ∈ C(A1), s.t. ξ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and (ξ,β) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) .
Assume the contrary, i.e., γ ∈ B ′ ⊃ B , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R2, and ξ ∈ C(A1), s.t. ξ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and (ξ,β) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) .
According to the ﬁrst condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF (Deﬁnition 12), it holds that α′ is not
acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1]. Contradiction.
• ∀β ∈ C(A1), if (β,α′) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) , then β is rejected w.r.t. E1. Assume the contrary. According to the second condition
of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF (Deﬁnition 12), it holds that α′ is not acceptable w.r.t. B under the
condition C(A1)[E1]. Contradiction. 
According to Lemma 1, we may directly obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let CAF[E1] = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1)[E1],I(C(A1),A2))) be an assigned CAF w.r.t. AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉, in which E1 ∈ ES (AF1).
• The set of all admissible sets of CAF[E1] form a complete partial order with respect to set inclusion.
• For each admissible set B of CAF[E1], there exists a preferred extension E2 of CAF[E1] such that B ⊆ E2 .
Since the empty set is always admissible, Theorem 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let CAF[E1] = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1)[E1],I(C(A1),A2))) be an assigned CAF w.r.t. AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉. CAF[E1] possesses at least
one preferred extension.
Existence and uniqueness of the grounded extension. In order to verify the existence and uniqueness of the grounded extension,
we ﬁrstly deﬁne the characteristic function of an assigned CAF, based on the work in [30].
Deﬁnition 16. Let CAF[E1] = (〈A2, R2〉, (C(A1)[E1],I(C(A1),A2))) be an assigned CAF w.r.t. AF1 = 〈A1, R1〉, in which E1 ∈
ES (AF1). Let B ⊆ A2 be a set of arguments. The characteristic function of CAF[E1], denoted as FCAF[E1] , is deﬁned as follows:
FCAF[E1] : 2A2 → 2A2
FCAF[E1](B) =
{
α ∈ A2 | α is acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1]
}
Theorem 2. Given B ⊆ A2 , if B is admissible, then: (1) B ⊆ FCAF[E1](B), and (2) FCAF[E1](B) is admissible.
Proof.
• If B is admissible, then ∀α ∈ B , α is acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1], from which it follows that
α ∈ FCAF[E1](B). So, B ⊆ FCAF[E1](B).• According to Deﬁnition 16, ∀α ∈ FCAF[E1](B), α is acceptable w.r.t. B ⊆ FCAF[E1](B) under the condition C(A1)[E1]. So,
we need only verify that FCAF[E1](B) is conﬂict-free. Assume that there exist α and α′ in FCAF[E1](B) s.t. (α,α′) ∈ R2.
Then, since α′ is acceptable w.r.t. B under the condition C(A1)[E1], according to Deﬁnition 12, there are the following
two possible cases:
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i) ∃γ ′ ∈ B , s.t. (γ ′, γ ) ∈ R2, contradicting “B is conﬂict-free” (in that B is admissible).
ii) ∃ξ ′ ∈ C(A1), s.t. ξ ′ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and (ξ ′, γ ) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) . It follows that γ /∈ B . Contradiction.
– ∃ξ ∈ C(A1), s.t. ξ is accepted w.r.t. E1 and (ξ,α) ∈ I(C(A1),A2) . According to Deﬁnition 12, α is not acceptable w.r.t.
B ⊆ FCAF[E1](B) under the condition C(A1)[E1]. Contradiction. 
According to Theorem 2, we directly have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. FCAF[E1] is monotonic (w.r.t. set inclusion).
Now that FCAF[E1] is monotonic and the empty set is admissible, by iteratively applying FCAF[E1](∅), when F iCAF[E1](∅) =
F i+1CAF[E1](∅), we will get the least ﬁxed point of FCAF[E1] , which is the grounded extension of CAF[E1]. Thus, there always
exists a grounded extension of an assigned CAF. Meanwhile, it is unique.
4.2. The division of an argumentation framework
The division of an argumentation framework is based on the notion of directionality of argumentation semantics [8,9], as
introduced in Section 2. Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A, R〉, for all α,β ∈ A, if there exists a directed path from
α to β , i.e., β is reachable from α, then under the semantics that satisﬁes directionality, the status of β may be affected
by α; otherwise, β is independent of α. Based on this idea, the notion of reachability, as well as the notions of affected and
unaffected between two arguments can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 17. Let α,β ∈ Uarg be two arguments, and R ⊆ Uarg × Uarg be a set of attacks. The reachability of two arguments
w.r.t. R is recursively deﬁned as follows:
• If (α,β) ∈ R , then β is reachable from α;
• If ∃γ ∈ Uarg , s.t. γ is reachable from α w.r.t. R and (γ ,β) ∈ R , then β is reachable from α.
According to Deﬁnition 17, the reachability relation is transitive, i.e., if γ is reachable from β and β is reachable from α,
then γ is reachable from α.
Deﬁnition 18. Let α,β ∈ Uarg be two arguments, and R ⊆ Uarg × Uarg be a set of attacks. We say that under the semantics
that satisﬁes directionality, the status of β is affected by α, if and only if β is reachable from α w.r.t. R . Otherwise, β is
unaffected by α w.r.t. R .
Based on Deﬁnition 18, given a set of arguments A ⊆ Uarg , it is possible to identify the subset of A that is affected by a
set of arguments B ⊆ Uarg or by a set of attacks (interactions) I ⊆ Uarg ×Uarg , with respect to a set of attacks R ⊆ Uarg ×Uarg .
In addition, we notice that the set of affected arguments related to an attack r = (α,β) can be computed through β , the
attacked argument of r. So, we will deﬁne the affected and unaffected arguments related to an attack r by using the attacked
argument of r. Here, we use attacked(r) to indicate the attacked argument of r, and attacked(I) = {attacked(r) | r ∈ I} to
indicate a set of arguments, each of which is the attacked argument of an attack in I .
Deﬁnition 19. Let A, B ⊆ Uarg be sets of arguments, and R, I ⊆ Uarg × Uarg be sets of attacks. We use afct(A, B, R) and
afct(A, I, R) to indicate the set of arguments within A that are affected respectively by B and I , with respect to R . Formally,
we have:
afct(A, B, R) =
⋃
α∈B
{β ∈ A: β is reachable from α w.r.t. R} (4)
afct(A, I, R) = attacked(I) ∪ afct(A,attacked(I), R) (5)
Based on the concept of affected and unaffected arguments, we are ready to deﬁne the concept of the division of an
argumentation framework. When an addition (B,IA: B ∪ IA) is added to (or a deletion (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) is deleted from)
an argumentation framework AF = 〈A, R〉, AF will be divided into three parts:
(i) a component of AF that is affected by (B,IA: B ∪ IA) (respectively (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B)),
(ii) a component of AF that is unaffected by (B,IA: B ∪ IA) (respectively (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B)), and
(iii) a subset of the unaffected component that conditions the affected arguments.
Formally, we ﬁrst present the deﬁnition of the division of an argumentation framework with respect to an addition
(B,IA: B ∪ IA).
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argumentation framework 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 is divided into three parts: 〈A⊕a , R⊕a 〉, 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, and (A⊕c , R⊕c ), where a, u, and c stand
for, respectively, affected, unaffected, and conditioning.
A⊕a = afct(A, B, R ∪ IA: B) ∪ afct(A,IA, R) ∪ B
A⊕u = A \
(
afct(A, B, R ∪ IA: B) ∪ afct(A,IA, R)
)
A⊕c =
{
β ∈ A⊕u
∣∣ ∃α ∈ A⊕a , s.t. (β,α) ∈ R ∪ IA: B ∪ IA
}
R⊕a = (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
(
A⊕a × A⊕a
)
R⊕u = R ∩
(
A⊕u × A⊕u
)
R⊕c = (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
(
A⊕c × A⊕a
)
In this deﬁnition, the set of affected arguments A⊕a contains those arguments in A that are affected by B and IA , as
well as those arguments in B . A⊕u is the set of arguments in A⊕ that are unaffected. The set of conditioning arguments A⊕c
contains those arguments in A⊕u that attack the arguments in A⊕a .
In order to insure the correctness of the division deﬁned in Deﬁnition 20, in this stage, we should verify that: (1) the
union of affected arguments and the unaffected ones is equal to the set of arguments in the updated argumentation frame-
work, i.e., A⊕a ∪ A⊕u = A⊕ (obvious), and (2) the union of attacks in three parts (affected, unaffected, conditioning) is equal
to the set of attacks in the updated argumentation framework, which is formulated by the following lemma:
Lemma 2. It holds that R⊕c ∪ R⊕a ∪ R⊕u = R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B .
Proof. Firstly, we identify the characteristics of the relations among A, A⊕u , A⊕c , and A⊕a : since arguments in A⊕a do not
attack arguments in A⊕u , it holds that (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩ (A⊕a × A⊕u ) = ∅; since in A⊕u , only arguments in A⊕c ⊆ A⊕u attack
A⊕a , it holds that (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕a ) = (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩ (A⊕c × A⊕a ); according to A⊕u = A \ (afct(A, B, R ∪
IA: B) ∪ afct(A,IA, R)) and A⊕a = afct(A, B, R ∪ IA: B) ∪ afct(A,IA, R) ∪ B , it holds that A⊕u ∪ A⊕a = A ∪ B . In addition, since
(IA ∪ IA: B) ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u ) = ∅, it holds that (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u ) = R ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u ). Secondly, according to these
relations, it holds that:
R⊕c ∪ R⊕a ∪ R⊕u =
(
(R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
(
A⊕c × A⊕a
))∪ ((R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
(
A⊕a × A⊕a
))∪ (R ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u
))
= (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
((
A⊕a × A⊕a
)∪ (A⊕u × A⊕u
)∪ (A⊕c × A⊕a
))
= (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
((
A⊕a × A⊕a
)∪ (A⊕u × A⊕u
)∪ (A⊕u × A⊕a
)∪ (A⊕a × A⊕u
))
= (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
((
A⊕u ∪ A⊕a
)× (A⊕u ∪ A⊕a
))
= (R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B) ∩
(
(A ∪ B) × (A ∪ B))
= R ∪ IA ∪ IA: B 
Similar to Deﬁnition 20, for the division of an argumentation framework with respect to a deletion, we have the following
deﬁnition and lemma:
Deﬁnition 21. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework, and (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) be a deletion to it. The updated
argumentation framework 〈A, R〉 is divided into three parts: 〈Aa , Ra 〉, 〈Au , Ru 〉, and (Ac , Rc ).
Aa = afct(A \ B, B, R) ∪ afct(A \ B,IA\B , R)
Au = A \
(
Aa ∪ B
)
Ac =
{
β ∈ Au
∣∣ ∃α ∈ Aa , s.t. (β,α) ∈ R \ IA\B
}
Ra = (R \ IA\B) ∩
(
Aa × Aa
)
Ru = R ∩
(
Au × Au
)
Rc = (R \ IA\B) ∩
(
Ac × Aa
)
In this deﬁnition, the set of affected arguments in Aa are those arguments in A \ B (i.e., A), that are affected by B and
IA\B . Au is the set of arguments that are unaffected. The set of conditioning arguments Ac contains those arguments in
Au that attack the arguments in Aa .
Lemma 3. It holds that Rc ∪ Ra ∪ Ru = R \ (IA\B: B ∪ IA\B).
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since in Au , only arguments in Ac ⊆ Au attack Aa , it holds that (R \ IA\B) ∩ (Au × Aa ) = (R \ IA\B) ∩ (Ac × Aa ); since
arguments in Aa do not attack arguments in Au , it holds that (R \ IA\B) ∩ (Aa × Au ) = ∅; since interactions in IA\B are
not related to B , it holds that IA\B ∩ ((A× B)∪ (B × A)) = ∅; according to Au = A \ (Aa ∪ B), it holds that Aa ∪ Au = A \ B;
and according to Deﬁnition 9, IA\B: B = R ∩ ((B × A) ∪ (A × B)). So, we have:
Rc ∪ Ra ∪ Ru =
(
(R \ IA\B) ∩
(
Ac × Aa
))∪ ((R \ IA\B) ∩
(
Aa × Aa
))∪ (R ∩ (Au × Au
))
= (R \ IA\B) ∩
((
Aa × Aa
)∪ (Au × Au
)∪ (Ac × Aa
))
= (R \ IA\B) ∩
((
Aa × Aa
)∪ (Au × Au
)∪ (Au × Aa
)∪ (Aa × Au
))
= (R \ IA\B) ∩
((
Aa ∪ Au
)× (Aa ∪ Au
))
= (R \ IA\B) ∩
(
(A \ B) × (A \ B))
= (R \ IA\B) ∩
(
(A × A) \ ((A × B) ∪ (B × A)))
= ((R \ IA\B) ∩ (A × A)
) \ ((R \ IA\B) ∩
(
(A × B) ∪ (B × A)))
= (R \ IA\B) \ IA\B: B
= R \ (IA\B: B ∪ IA\B) 
After division, we will construct two sub-frameworks of the updated argumentation framework 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (respectively,
〈A, R〉): a Dung style sub-framework and a conditioned sub-framework. First, the Dung style sub-framework of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉
is 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, while the conditioned sub-framework of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 with respect to 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 is constructed according to〈A⊕a , R⊕a 〉 and (A⊕c , R⊕c ) as follows:
CAF1 =
(〈
A⊕a , R⊕a
〉
,
(
A⊕c , R⊕c
))
(6)
According to Deﬁnition 20, we may infer that: (i) A⊕a ∩ A⊕u = ∅, (ii) A⊕c ⊆ A⊕u , and ∀α ∈ A⊕c , ∃β ∈ A⊕a , such that α
attacks β , and (iii) R⊕c ⊆ A⊕c × A⊕a . In other words, CAF1 satisﬁes the three requirements of a conditioned argumentation
framework listed in Deﬁnition 11.
Similarly, we may construct two sub-frameworks of the updated argumentation framework 〈A, R〉: a Dung style sub-
framework 〈Au , Ru 〉, and a conditioned sub-framework with respect to 〈Au , Ru 〉, which is deﬁned as follows:
CAF2 =
(〈
Aa , Ra
〉
,
(
Ac , Rc
))
(7)
According to Deﬁnition 21, we may infer that: (i) Aa ∩ Au = ∅, (ii) Ac ⊆ Au , and ∀α ∈ Ac , ∃β ∈ Aa , such that α
attacks β , and (iii) Rc ⊆ Ac × Aa . So, CAF2 also satisﬁes the three requirements of a conditioned argumentation framework
listed in Deﬁnition 11.
Finally, based on Lemmas 2 and 3, the following theorem shows the correctness of the division deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 20
and 21, respectively.
Theorem 3. Syntactically, the result of combining 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 and CAF1 = (〈A⊕a , R⊕a 〉, (A⊕a , R⊕c )) is equal to 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 = 〈A ∪ B, R ∪
(IA: B ∪IA)〉, i.e., A⊕u ∪ A⊕a = A∪ B, and R⊕u ∪ R⊕a ∪ R⊕c = R ∪IA: B ∪IA ;while the result of combining 〈Au , Ru 〉 and CAF2 = (〈Aa ,
Ra 〉, (Ac , Rc )) is equal to 〈A, R〉 = 〈A \ B, R \(IA\B: B ∪IA\B)〉, i.e., Au ∪ Aa = A \ B, and Ru ∪ Ra ∪ Rc = R \(IA\B: B ∪IA\B).
Proof. Since A⊕u = A \ (afct(A, B, R ∪IA: B)∪ afct(A,IA, R)) and A⊕a = afct(A, B, R ∪IA: B)∪ afct(A,IA, R)∪ B , it holds that
A⊕u ∪ A⊕a = A ∪ B; according to Lemma 2, R⊕u ∪ R⊕a ∪ R⊕c = R ∪ IA: B ∪ IA . On the other hand, since Au = A \ (Aa ∪ B), it
holds that Au ∪ Aa = (A \ (Aa ∪ B)) ∪ Aa = A \ B; according to Lemma 3, Ru ∪ Ra ∪ Rc = R \ (IA\B: B ∪ IA\B). 
Example 5. Let AF = 〈A, R〉 be an argumentation framework, in which A = {α1,α2,α3,α4,α5,α6,α7,α8} and R = {(α1,α2),
(α2,α1), (α1,α3), (α2,α3), (α3,α4), (α5,α6), (α6,α5), (α7,α8), (α8,α7)} (Fig. 3). Let (B,IA: B ∪ IA) be an addition, in
which B = {α9,α10}, IA: B = {(α4,α9), (α9,α10), (α5,α10), (α10,α7)}, and IA = {(α2,α5)}. According to Deﬁnition 20, the
division of the updated argumentation framework 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 = 〈A ∪ B, R ∪ (IA: B ∪ IA)〉 as well as the corresponding CAF
are as follows:
〈
A⊕a , R⊕a
〉= 〈{α5,α6,α7,α8,α9,α10},
{
(α5,α6), (α6,α5), (α7,α8), (α8,α7), (α5,α10), (α9,α10), (α10,α7)
}〉
〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉= 〈{α1,α2,α3,α4},
{
(α1,α2), (α2,α1), (α1,α3), (α2,α3), (α3,α4)
}〉
(
A⊕c , R⊕c
)= ({α2,α4},
{
(α2,α5), (α4,α9)
})
CAF1 =
(〈
A⊕a , R⊕a
〉
,
(
A⊕c , R⊕c
))
In this example, it is obvious that 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 is equal to the combination of 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 and CAF1.
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4.3. Computing the semantics of an updated argumentation framework based on the division
4.3.1. Deﬁnitions
Based on the concept of the division of an argumentation framework, we are now ready to compute the semantics of
the two kinds of sub-frameworks described above and combine them to form the semantics of the updated frameworks
〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and 〈A, R〉 respectively.
On the one hand, let ES (AF) be the set of extensions of an argumentation framework AF = 〈A, R〉, under the argumen-
tation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}. According to the directionality of argumentation semantics, the set of extensions
of the unaffected sub-framework 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 with respect to an addition (B,IA: B ∪ IA) (respectively, 〈Au , Ru 〉 with respect
to a deletion (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B)) can be obtained directly (please refer to Deﬁnition 8):
ES
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉)= {E ∩ A⊕u
∣∣ E ∈ ES(AF)
}
(8)
ES
(〈
Au , Ru
〉)= {E ∩ Au
∣∣ E ∈ ES(AF)
}
(9)
On the other hand, according to Deﬁnition 11, the extensions of conditioned sub-frameworks are not computed directly.
They are related to the status of the conditioning arguments. In other words, we should ﬁrstly construct two sets of assigned
conditioned sub-frameworks:
CAF1[E1] =
(〈
A⊕a , R⊕a
〉
,
(
A⊕c [E1], R⊕c
))
, ∀E1 ∈ ES
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉)
(10)
CAF2[E1] =
(〈
Aa , Ra
〉
,
(
Ac [E1], Rc
))
, ∀E1 ∈ ES
(〈
Au , Ru
〉)
(11)
In these formulas, A⊕c [E1] and Ac [E1] are computed according to the status assignment of 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 and 〈Au , Ru 〉
respectively, i.e., S(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, E1) = (A(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, E1), R(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, E1), U(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, E1)), in which E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉);
S(〈Au , Ru 〉, E1) = (A(〈Au , Ru 〉, E1), R(〈Au , Ru 〉, E1), U(〈Au , Ru 〉, E1)), in which E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉). Formally, we have:
A⊕c [E1] =
(
A
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉
, E1
)∩ A⊕c ,R
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉
, E1
)∩ A⊕c ,U
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉
, E1
)∩ A⊕c
)
(12)
Ac [E1] =
(
A
(〈
Au , Ru
〉
, E1
)∩ Ac ,R
(〈
Au , Ru
〉
, E1
)∩ Ac ,U
(〈
Au , Ru
〉
, E1
)∩ Ac
)
(13)
And then, according to Deﬁnitions 12 and 13, the extensions of assigned conditioned sub-frameworks, i.e., ES (CAF1[E1])
and ES (CAF2[E1]), can be obtained.
Based on the extensions of the two kinds of sub-frameworks, we will compute the extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 by combining
ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and ES (CAF1[E1]), in which E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), and the extensions of 〈A, R〉 by combining ES (〈Au , Ru 〉)
and ES (CAF2[E1]), in which E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉).
Deﬁnition 22. Let 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 be the unaffected sub-framework of AF = 〈A, R〉 w.r.t. an addition (B,IA: B ∪IA), ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉)
be the set of extensions of 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, and CAF1[E1] = (〈A⊕a , R⊕a 〉, (A⊕c [E1], R⊕c )) be an assigned conditioned sub-framework
w.r.t. E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). The result of combining ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and ES (CAF1[E1]), ∀E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), to form the set of
combined extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉, denoted as CombExtS (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), is deﬁned as follows:
CombExtS
(〈
A⊕, R⊕
〉)= {E1 ∪ E2
∣∣ E1 ∈ ES
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉)∧ E2 ∈ ES
(
CAF1[E1]
)}
(14)
Deﬁnition 23. Let 〈Au , Ru 〉 be the unaffected sub-framework of AF = 〈A, R〉 w.r.t. a deletion (B,IA\B: B ∪ IA\B),
ES (〈Au , Ru 〉) be the set of extensions of 〈Au , Ru 〉, and CAF2[E1] = (〈Aa , Ra 〉, (Ac [E1], Rc )) be an assigned conditioned
sub-framework w.r.t. E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉). The result of combining ES (〈Au , Ru 〉) and ES (CAF2[E1]), ∀E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉), to
form the set of combined extensions of 〈A, R〉, denoted as CombExtS (〈A, R〉), is deﬁned as follows:
CombExtS
(〈
A, R
〉)= {E1 ∪ E2
∣∣ E1 ∈ ES
(〈
Au , Ru
〉)∧ E2 ∈ ES
(
CAF2[E1]
)}
(15)
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Soundness and completeness of the semantics combination. Corresponding to Theorem 3, we will prove that under each ar-
gumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR, ID}, the extensions of an updated framework (〈A⊕, R⊕〉 or 〈A, R〉) are the
same as those deﬁned by combining the extensions of the unaffected sub-framework and those of the assigned conditioned
sub-frameworks (as shown in formulas (14) and (15)). Before we prove this property, we ﬁrstly ﬁgure out the relationship
between a complete extension of an updated argumentation framework and a complete extension of an assigned condi-
tioned sub-framework of it.
On the one hand, in the case of an addition to an argumentation framework, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For all E ∈ ECO(〈A⊕, R⊕〉), it holds that E ∩ A⊕a ∈ ECO(CAF1[E1]), in which E1 = E ∩ A⊕u .
Proof. Since complete semantics satisﬁes the directionality criterion, and A⊕u is an unattacked set, according to Deﬁnition 8,
it holds that E1 = E ∩ A⊕u ∈ ECO(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). According to Deﬁnitions 12 and 13, since it is obvious that E ∩ A⊕a ⊆ A⊕a and
E ∩ A⊕a is conﬂict-free, in order to prove that E ∩ A⊕a is a complete extension of CAF1[E1], we only need to verify the
following two points:
• Every argument in E ∩ A⊕a is acceptable w.r.t. E ∩ A⊕a under the condition A⊕c [E1], which is proved as follows:
Since every argument in E ∩ A⊕a ⊆ E is acceptable w.r.t. E , it holds that ∀α ∈ E ∩ A⊕a ⊆ A⊕a , ∀β ∈ A⊕ , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕ ,
then ∃γ ∈ E , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕ . Since α ∈ A⊕a and α is not attacked by the arguments in A⊕ \ (A⊕c ∪ A⊕a ), it holds that
β ∈ A⊕c ⊆ A⊕ or β ∈ A⊕a ⊆ A⊕ . So, we have the following two cases:
(i) If β ∈ A⊕c , then: since β is attacked by the arguments in A⊕u , it holds that γ ∈ E ∩ A⊕u = E1, i.e., the status of
argument that attacks α is rejected w.r.t. E1 (satisfying the second condition of acceptability of arguments in an
assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12);
(ii) Else, if β ∈ A⊕a , then: since β is attacked by the arguments in A⊕a or A⊕c , it holds that γ ∈ E ∩ A⊕a or γ ∈ E ∩ A⊕c =
E1 ∩ A⊕c (satisfying the ﬁrst condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12).
As a result, according to Deﬁnition 12, α is acceptable w.r.t. E ∩ A⊕a under the condition A⊕c [E1].• Every argument α in A⊕a that is acceptable w.r.t. E ∩ A⊕a under the condition A⊕c [E1] is in E ∩ A⊕a , which is proved as
follows:
Since α is attacked by the arguments in A⊕a or A⊕c , when α is acceptable w.r.t. E ∩ A⊕a under the condition A⊕c [E1], we
have the following two cases:
(i) If α is attacked by β ∈ A⊕a , then according the ﬁrst condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF
(Deﬁnition 12), ∃γ ∈ E ∩ A⊕a ⊆ E , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕a ⊆ R⊕ , or ∃ξ ∈ E1 ∩ A⊕c ⊆ E , s.t. (ξ,β) ∈ R⊕c ⊆ R⊕; and
(ii) If α is attacked by β ∈ A⊕c , then according the second condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF
(Deﬁnition 12), β is rejected w.r.t. E1, i.e., ∃γ ∈ E1 ⊆ E , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕u ⊆ R⊕ .
As a result, for any argument β that attacks α, there exists an argument in E that attacks β . Therefore, α is acceptable
w.r.t. E . Since every argument in A⊕ ⊇ A⊕a that is acceptable w.r.t. E is in E , it holds that α is in E . Since α /∈ E1 (in that
α /∈ A⊕u ), it holds that α is in E ∩ A⊕a (otherwise, α /∈ (E ∩ A⊕a )∪ E1 = (E ∩ A⊕a )∪ (E ∩ A⊕u ) = E , contradicting α ∈ E). 
On the other hand, in the case of a deletion to an argumentation framework, we have the following lemma (the proof is
similar to that of Lemma 4 (omitted)):
Lemma 5. For all E ∈ ECO(〈A, R〉), it holds that E ∩ Aa ∈ ECO(CAF2[E1]), in which E1 = E ∩ Au .
Then, based on Lemmas 4 and 5, the soundness of semantics combination is formulated in Theorems 4 (in the case of
an addition to an argumentation framework) and 5 (in the case of a deletion to an argumentation framework), respectively.
Since the proofs of these two theorems are similar, we only provide one of them in this paper.
Theorem 4 (Soundness). Under each argumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ CombExtS (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), it holds that
E ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), in which E = E1 ∪ E2 , an extension by combining E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E2 ∈ ES (CAF1[E1]).
Proof.
• Under complete semantics, E1 ∈ ECO(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E2 ∈ ECO(CAF1[E1]): according to Deﬁnitions 2 and 3, in order to
prove that E1 ∪ E2 ∈ ECO(〈A⊕, R⊕〉), in which 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 = 〈A∪ B, R ∪ (IA: B ∪IA)〉, we should prove that: (1) E1 ∪ E2 ⊆
A⊕ , (2) E1 ∪ E2 is conﬂict-free, (3) every argument in E1 ∪ E2 is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2, and (4) every argument in
A⊕ that is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2 is in E1 ∪ E2.
– (1) According to Theorem 3, A⊕u ∪ A⊕a = A ∪ B . Since E1 ∪ E2 ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , we have E1 ∪ E2 ⊆ A ∪ B = A⊕ .
– (2) ∀α ∈ E1 ⊆ A⊕u ,∀β ∈ E2 ⊆ A⊕a , it holds that β does not attack α, for the reason that A⊕u is unaffected; meanwhile,
it also holds that α does not attack β . Otherwise, assume that (α,β) ∈ R⊕c , then β is attacked by a conditioning
argument that is accepted w.r.t. E1. According to the second condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned
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E1 ∪ E2 is conﬂict-free.
– (3) We should prove that ∀α ∈ E1 ∪ E2, ∀β ∈ A⊕ , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕ , then ∃γ ∈ E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕ .
(i) First, ∀α ∈ E1, α ∈ A⊕u . So, α is only attacked by the arguments in A⊕u (there exists no argument in A⊕a that
attacks α). Since α is acceptable w.r.t. E1, it holds that: ∀β ∈ A⊕u ⊆ A⊕ , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕u ⊆ R⊕ , then ∃γ ∈ E1 ⊆
E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕u ⊆ R⊕ .
(ii) Second, ∀α ∈ E2, there are two possible cases: α is attacked by the arguments in A⊕c w.r.t. R⊕c , or by the argu-
ments in A⊕a w.r.t. R⊕a . So, if (β,α) ∈ R⊕ , then it holds that: β ∈ A⊕c and (β,α) ∈ R⊕c , or β ∈ A⊕a and (β,α) ∈ R⊕a .
Since α is acceptable w.r.t. E2 under the condition A⊕c [E1], it holds that:
(a) if β ∈ A⊕c and (β,α) ∈ R⊕c , then β is rejected w.r.t. E1 (corresponding to the second condition of acceptability
of arguments in an assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12), i.e., ∃γ ∈ E1 ⊆ E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕u ⊆ R⊕; and
(b) if β ∈ A⊕a and (β,α) ∈ R⊕a , then ∃γ ∈ E2 ⊆ E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕a ⊆ R⊕ , or ∃ξ ∈ A⊕c , s.t. ξ is accepted
w.r.t. E1 and (ξ,β) ∈ R⊕c ⊆ R⊕ , i.e., ∃ξ ∈ E1 ∩ A⊕c ⊆ E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (ξ,β) ∈ R⊕c ⊆ R⊕ (corresponding to the ﬁrst
condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12).
Put (i) and (ii) together, we have: ∀α ∈ E1 ∪ E2, ∀β ∈ A⊕ , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕ , then ∃γ ∈ E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕ . Therefore,
every argument in E1 ∪ E2 is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2.
– (4) Assume that ∃α ∈ A⊕ = A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , s.t. α is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2, but α /∈ E1 ∪ E2.
(i) If α ∈ A⊕u , then α is only attacked by the arguments in A⊕u . Since α is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2, it holds that∀β ∈ A⊕u ⊆ A⊕ (there exists no argument in A⊕a that attacks α), if (β,α) ∈ R⊕ ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u ) = R⊕u , then ∃γ ∈
(E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕u = E1, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕ ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u ) = R⊕u , i.e., α is acceptable w.r.t. E1. Since α /∈ E1 ∪ E2, it holds
that α /∈ E1. So, E1 is not a complete extension, contradicting E1 ∈ ECO(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉).
(ii) If α ∈ A⊕a , then α is attacked by the arguments in A⊕a w.r.t. R⊕a or by the arguments in A⊕c w.r.t. R⊕c . Since α is
acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2, it holds that:
(a) ∀β ∈ A⊕a , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕a ⊆ R⊕ , then: since β is in turn attacked by the arguments in A⊕a w.r.t. R⊕a or A⊕c w.r.t.
R⊕c , it holds that ∃γ ∈ (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕a = E2, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕ ∩ (A⊕a × A⊕a ) = R⊕a , or ∃γ ′ ∈ (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕c =
E1 ∩ A⊕c , s.t. (γ ′, β) ∈ R⊕ ∩ (A⊕c × A⊕a ) = R⊕c (satisfying the ﬁrst condition of acceptability of arguments in an
assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12); and
(b) ∀β ∈ A⊕c , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕c ⊆ R⊕ , then: since β is attacked by the arguments in A⊕u , it holds that ∃γ ∈ (E1 ∪
E2) ∩ A⊕u = E1, s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕u ∩ (A⊕u × A⊕u ) = R⊕u , i.e., β is rejected w.r.t. E1 (satisfying the second condition
of acceptability of arguments in an assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12).
As a result, α is acceptable w.r.t. E2 under the condition A⊕c [E1]. Since α /∈ E1 ∪ E2, it holds that α /∈ E2. So, E2
is not a complete extension, contradicting E2 ∈ ECO(CAF1[E1]).
According to (i) and (ii), we have: ∀α ∈ A⊕ = A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , if α is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2, then α ∈ E1 ∪ E2. Therefore,
every argument in A⊕ that is acceptable w.r.t. E1 ∪ E2 is in E1 ∪ E2.
• Under preferred semantics, E1 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E2 ∈ EPR(CAF1[E1]): since a preferred extension is also a com-
plete extension, based on the proof in the case of complete semantics, we only need to prove that E1 ∪ E2 is a maximal
(w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. Assume that E1 ∪ E2 is not a maximal complete extension. Then,
∃S ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , s.t. S is a preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and S ⊇ E1 ∪ E2. Let Φ = S \ (E1 ∪ E2). If Φ = ∅, then
S = E1 ∪ E2. In this case, E1 ∪ E2 is a preferred extension. So, we need only to discuss the case when Φ = ∅. Let
Φ ′ = Φ ∩ A⊕u and Φ ′′ = Φ ∩ A⊕a . Since A⊕u ∩ A⊕a = ∅ and Φ ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , it holds that Φ ′ ∪ Φ ′′ = Φ and Φ ′ ∩ Φ ′′ = ∅.
On the one hand, when Φ ′ = ∅, since E1 = (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕u and Φ ′ = Φ ∩ A⊕u , it holds that E1 ∪ Φ ′ = (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ Φ) ∩
A⊕u = S ∩ A⊕u . Since preferred semantics satisﬁes the directionality criterion, and A⊕u is an unattacked set, according to
Deﬁnition 8, it holds that E1 ∪ Φ ′ = S ∩ A⊕u ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Therefore, E1 is not a preferred extension, contradicting
E1 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉).
On the other hand, when Φ = ∅, if Φ ′ = ∅, then Φ ′′ = ∅. In this case, since E2 = (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕a and Φ ′′ = Φ ∩ A⊕a , it
holds that E2 ∪ Φ ′′ = (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ Φ) ∩ A⊕a = S ∩ A⊕a . Since a preferred extension is also a complete extension, according
to Lemma 4, it holds that E2 ∪ Φ ′′ = S ∩ A⊕a ∈ ECO(CAF1[E1]). So, E2 is not a preferred extension, contradicting E2 ∈
EPR(CAF1[E1]).
As a result, we may conclude that E1 ∪ E2 is a maximal complete extension (i.e., preferred extension).
• Under grounded semantics, E1 ∈ EGR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E2 ∈ EGR(CAF1[E1]): since a grounded extension is also a com-
plete extension, based on the proof in the case of complete semantics, we only need to prove that E1 ∪ E2 is the
minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. Assume that E1 ∪ E2 is not a minimal complete exten-
sion, then ∃S ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , s.t. S is a grounded extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 and S ⊆ E1 ∪ E2. Let Φ = (E1 ∪ E2) \ S . If Φ = ∅,
then S = E1 ∪ E2. In this case, E1 ∪ E2 is a grounded extension. So, we need only to discuss the case when Φ = ∅. Let
Φ ′ = Φ ∩ A⊕u and Φ ′′ = Φ ∩ A⊕a . Since A⊕u ∩ A⊕a = ∅ and Φ ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , it holds that Φ ′ ∪ Φ ′′ = Φ and Φ ′ ∩ Φ ′′ = ∅.
On the one hand, when Φ ′ = ∅, since E1 = (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕u and Φ ′ = Φ ∩ A⊕u , it holds that E1 \ Φ ′ = ((E1 ∪ E2) \ Φ) ∩
A⊕u = S ∩ A⊕u . Since grounded semantics satisﬁes the directionality criterion, and A⊕u is an unattacked set, according to
Deﬁnition 8, it holds that E1 \ Φ ′ = S ∩ A⊕u ∈ EGR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Therefore, E1 is not a grounded extension, contradicting
E1 ∈ EGR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉).
On the other hand, when Φ = ∅, if Φ ′ = ∅, then Φ ′′ = ∅. In this case, since E2 = (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕a and Φ ′′ = Φ ∩ A⊕a , it
holds that E2 \Φ ′′ = ((E1 ∪ E2) \Φ)∩ A⊕a = S ∩ A⊕a . Since a grounded extension is also a complete extension, according
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EGR(CAF1[E1]).
As a result, we may conclude that E1 ∪ E2 is a minimal complete extension (i.e., grounded extension).
• Under ideal semantics, E1 ∈ EID(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E2 ∈ EID(CAF1[E1]): we need to prove that: (1) E1 ∪ E2 is admissible,
(2) E1 ∪ E2 is contained in every preferred set of arguments, and (3) E1 ∪ E2 is the maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) ideal
set.
– First, since both E1 and E2 are admissible, according to the proof in the case of complete semantics, it holds that
E1 ∪ E2 is also admissible (i.e., it holds that E1 ∪ E2 is conﬂict-free, and every argument in E1 ∪ E2 is acceptable w.r.t.
E1 ∪ E2).
– Second, ∀E ′1 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), ∀E ′2 ∈ EPR(CAF1[E ′1]), according to the proof in the case of preferred semantics, it
holds that E ′1 ∪ E ′2 is a preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. Since both E1 and E2 are contained in every preferred set
of arguments, we have E1 ⊆ E ′1 and E2 ⊆ E ′2, respectively. Therefore, E1 ∪ E2 ⊆ E ′1 ∪ E ′2. In other words, E1 ∪ E2 is
contained in every preferred set of arguments E ′1 ∪ E ′2 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉).
– Third, assume that E1 ∪ E2 is not the maximal ideal set. Then, ∃S ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a , s.t. S is the ideal extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉
and S ⊇ E1 ∪ E2. Let Φ = S \ (E1 ∪ E2). If Φ = ∅, then S = E1 ∪ E2. In this case, E1 ∪ E2 is the ideal extension. So, we
need only to discuss the case when Φ = ∅. Let Φ ′ = Φ ∩ A⊕u and Φ ′′ = Φ ∩ A⊕a . Since A⊕u ∩ A⊕a = ∅ and Φ ⊆ A⊕u ∪ A⊕a ,
it holds that Φ ′ ∪ Φ ′′ = Φ and Φ ′ ∩ Φ ′′ = ∅.
On the one hand, when Φ ′ = ∅, since E1 = (E1 ∪ E2) ∩ A⊕u and Φ ′ = Φ ∩ A⊕u , it holds that E1 ∪ Φ ′ = (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ Φ) ∩
A⊕u = S ∩ A⊕u . Since ideal semantics satisﬁes the directionality criterion, and A⊕u is an unattacked set, according to
Deﬁnition 8, it holds that E1 ∪ Φ ′ = S ∩ A⊕u ∈ EID(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Therefore, E1 is not an ideal extension, contradicting
E1 ∈ EID(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉).
On the other hand, when Φ = ∅, if Φ ′ = ∅, then Φ ′′ = ∅. In this case, we have:
i) E2 ∪ Φ ′′ is admissible, because:
(a) E2 ∪ Φ ′′ ⊆ S is conﬂict-free (obvious); and
(b) Every argument in E2 ∪ Φ ′′ is acceptable w.r.t. E2 ∪ Φ ′′ under the condition A⊕c [E1 ∪ Φ ′], which is proved
as follows: Since every argument in E2 ∪ Φ ′′ ⊆ S is acceptable w.r.t. S , it holds that ∀α ∈ E2 ∪ Φ ′′ ⊆ A⊕a ,∀β ∈ A⊕ , if (β,α) ∈ R⊕ , then ∃γ ∈ S , s.t. (γ ,β) ∈ R⊕ . Since α ∈ A⊕a and α is not attacked by the arguments
in A⊕ \ (A⊕c ∪ A⊕a ), it holds that β ∈ A⊕c ⊆ A⊕ or β ∈ A⊕a ⊆ A⊕ . So, we have the following two cases:
– If β ∈ A⊕c , then: since β is attacked by the arguments in A⊕u , it holds that γ ∈ S ∩ A⊕u = E1 ∪ Φ ′ , i.e., the
status of argument that attacks α is rejected w.r.t. E1 ∪ Φ ′ (satisfying the second condition of acceptability
of arguments in an assigned CAF, in Deﬁnition 12);
– Else, if β ∈ A⊕a , then: since β is attacked by the arguments in A⊕a or A⊕c , it holds that γ ∈ S ∩ A⊕a = E2 ∪Φ ′′
or γ ∈ S ∩ A⊕c = (E1 ∪ Φ ′) ∩ A⊕c (satisfying the ﬁrst condition of acceptability of arguments in an assigned
CAF, in Deﬁnition 12).
According to Deﬁnition 12, α is acceptable w.r.t. E2 ∪ Φ ′′ under the condition A⊕c [E1 ∪ Φ ′].
ii) E2 ∪ Φ ′′ is contained in every preferred set of arguments, which is proved as follows. ∀E ′1 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉),∀E ′2 ∈ EPR(CAF1[E ′1]), according to the proof in the case of preferred semantics, E ′1 ∪ E ′2 is a preferred extension
of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. It follows that S ⊆ E ′1 ∪ E ′2. We assume that E2 ∪ Φ ′′  E ′2. Then, ∃α ∈ E2 ∪ Φ ′′ , s.t. α /∈ E ′2. Since
α /∈ E ′1 ⊆ A⊕u (in that α ∈ A⊕a and A⊕a ∩ A⊕u = ∅), α /∈ E ′1 ∪ E ′2. It follows that α /∈ S . Since E2 ∪ Φ ′′ ⊆ S , if follows
that α /∈ E2 ∪ Φ ′′ . Contradiction.
Therefore, E2 ∪ Φ ′′ is an ideal set. So, E2 is not an ideal extension, contradicting E2 ∈ EID(CAF1[E1]).
According to the above analysis, we may conclude that E1 ∪ E2 is the ideal extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. 
Theorem 5 (Soundness). Under each argumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ CombExtS (〈A, R〉), it holds that
E ∈ ES (〈A, R〉), in which E = E1 ∪ E2 , an extension by combining E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉) and E2 ∈ ES (CAF2[E1]).
And then, according to Lemmas 4 and 5, and Theorems 4 and 5, we immediately get Lemmas 6 and 7. Due to the
similarity between Lemmas 6 and 7, we only provide the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Under each argumentation semantics S ∈ {PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), it holds that E ∩ A⊕a ∈ ES (CAF1[E1]), in
which E1 = E ∩ A⊕u .
Proof. According to Lemma 4, under complete semantics, E ∩ A⊕a ∈ ECO(CAF1[E1]). Now, we prove the following three
cases:
(1) Under preferred semantics, we only need to verify that E ∩ A⊕a is maximal. Assume the contrary. Then, ∃E ′2 ∈EPR(CAF1[E1]), s.t. E ′2 ⊃ E ∩ A⊕a . It follows that E1 ∪ E ′2 ⊃ (E ∩ A⊕u ) ∪ (E ∩ A⊕a ) = E . Since E ∈ EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉), accord-
ing to Deﬁnition 8, we have E1 = E ∩ A⊕u ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Now that E1 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E ′2 ∈ EPR(CAF1[E1]),
according to Theorem 4, E1 ∪ E ′ is a preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. As a result, E /∈ EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Contradiction.2
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ing to Deﬁnition 8, we have E1 = E ∩ A⊕u ∈ EGR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Now that E1 ∈ EGR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E ′2 ∈ EGR(CAF1[E1]),
according to Theorem 4, E1 ∪ E ′2 is a grounded extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. As a result, E /∈ EGR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Contradiction.
(3) Under ideal semantics, according to the proof of Lemma 4, it holds that E ∩ A⊕a is admissible. So, we only need to verify
the following two points:
i) E ∩ A⊕a is contained in every preferred set of arguments, which is proved as follows. ∀E ′1 ∈ EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), ∀E ′2 ∈EPR(CAF1[E ′1]), according to Theorem 4, E ′1 ∪ E ′2 is a preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. Since E is the ideal extension
of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉, it holds that E ⊆ E ′1 ∪ E ′2. Now, assume that E ∩ A⊕a  E ′2. Then, ∃α ∈ E ∩ A⊕a (and thus α ∈ E), s.t.
α /∈ E ′2. Since α ∈ E ∩ A⊕a , it holds that α ∈ A⊕a . Since A⊕u ∩ A⊕a = ∅, and E ′1 ⊆ A⊕u , it holds that α /∈ E ′1. In other
words, ∃α ∈ E , s.t. α /∈ E ′1 ∪ E ′2. So, it is not the case that E ⊆ E ′1 ∪ E ′2, contradicting E ⊆ E ′1 ∪ E ′2.
ii) E ∩ A⊕a is the maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) ideal set. Assume the contrary. Then, ∃E ′2 ∈ EID(CAF1[E1]), s.t. E ′2 ⊃
E ∩ A⊕a . It follows that E1 ∪ E ′2 ⊃ (E ∩ A⊕u ) ∪ (E ∩ A⊕a ) = E . Since E ∈ EID(〈A⊕, R⊕〉), according to Deﬁnition 8, we
have E1 = E∩ A⊕u ∈ EID(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Now that E1 ∈ EID(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E ′2 ∈ EID(CAF1[E1]), according to Theorem 4,
E1 ∪ E ′2 is the ideal extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. As a result, E /∈ EID(〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Contradiction. 
Lemma 7. Under each argumentation semantics S ∈ {PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ ES (〈A, R〉), it holds that E ∩ Aa ∈ ES (CAF2[E1]), in
which E1 = E ∩ Au .
Finally, based on Lemmas 4, 5, 6, and 7, the completeness of semantics combination can be proved easily as follows:
Theorem 6 (Completeness). Under each argumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), it holds that E ∈
CombExtS ( 〈A⊕, R⊕〉).
Proof. Under a given argumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), let E1 = A⊕u ∩ E , and E2 =
A⊕a ∩ E . It holds that E = E1 ∪ E2. According to Deﬁnition 8, Lemmas 4 and 6, it holds that E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and E2 ∈
ES (CAF1[E1]). According to Deﬁnition 22, it holds that E ∈ CombExtPR(〈A⊕ , R⊕〉). 
Theorem 7 (Completeness). Under each argumentation semantics S ∈ {CO,PR,GR,ID}, ∀E ∈ ES (〈A, R〉), it holds that E ∈
CombExtS (〈A, R〉).
Proof. Similar to that of Theorem 6 (omitted). 
Correctness of status evolution of arguments by using the division-based method. In this paragraph, we will prove that when an
argumentation framework AF = 〈A, R〉 is changed to 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 or 〈A, R〉, by using the division-based method, the status
of each argument with respect to a given extension of AF (respectively, the justiﬁcation state of each argument with respect
to the set of extensions of AF) evolves correctly, in the sense that:
• If an argument in 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (or 〈A, R〉) is unaffected, then its status with respect to a given extension of AF should
be the same as the one with respect to a related extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (respectively, 〈A, R〉); and the justiﬁcation
state with respect to the set of extensions of AF should the same as the one with respect to the set of extensions of
〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (respectively, 〈A, R〉).
• If an argument in 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (or 〈A, R〉) is affected, then its status with respect to a given extension of a conditioned
CAF should be the same as the one with respect to a related extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (respectively, 〈A, R〉); and the
justiﬁcation state with respect to sets of extensions of a set of assigned CAFs should be the same as the one with
respect to the set of extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (respectively, 〈A, R〉).
First, in the case of an addition to an argumentation framework, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 8. For all α ∈ A⊕u , α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. an extension E ∈ ES (AF), if and only if ∃E1 ∈
ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and ∃E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), s.t. E ∩ E ′ ⊇ E1 and α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. E1 and E ′
respectively.
Proof. (⇒)
• If α is accepted w.r.t. an extension E ∈ ES (AF), then α ∈ E . Let E1 = E ∩ A⊕u . According to formula (8), E1 ∈
ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Since α ∈ A⊕u and α ∈ E , it holds that α ∈ E1, i.e., α is accepted w.r.t. E1. Meanwhile, according to
formula (14), ∃E2 ∈ ES (CAF1[E1]), s.t. E1 ∪ E2 ∈ CombExtS (〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Let E ′ = E1 ∪ E2. Since E ⊇ E1 and E ′ ⊇ E1, it
holds that E ∩ E ′ ⊇ E1. According to Theorem 4, we have E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Since α ∈ E1 and E1 ⊆ E ′ , it holds that
α ∈ E ′ , i.e., α is accepted w.r.t. E ′ .
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β ∈ A⊕u , and therefore β ∈ E ∩ A⊕u = E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). So, β is rejected w.r.t. E1. Meanwhile, since E ′ ⊇ E1 (similar to
the proof in the ﬁrst item), it holds that β ∈ E ′ , and therefore α is rejected w.r.t. E ′ .
• If α is undecided w.r.t. E , then α /∈ E and ∀β ∈ E , (β,α) /∈ R . It follows that α /∈ E ∩ A⊕u = E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), and ∀β ∈
E ∩ A⊕u = E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), (β,α) /∈ R⊕u . Hence, α is undecided w.r.t. E1. On the other hand, according to formula (14)
and Theorem 4, ∃E2 ∈ ES (CAF1[E1]), s.t. E1 ∪ E2 ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Let E ′ = E1 ∪ E2, and therefore E ∩ E ′ ⊇ E1. Since
α /∈ A⊕a , it holds that α /∈ E2. By α /∈ E1 and α /∈ E2, we have α /∈ E ′ . Meanwhile, since ∀β ∈ E1, (β,α) /∈ R⊕u , and α is
not attacked by the arguments in A⊕a , it holds that ∀β ∈ E ′ , (β,α) /∈ R⊕ . As a result, α is undecided w.r.t. E ′ .
(⇐)
• If α is accepted w.r.t. E1 (and E ′ , respectively), then α ∈ E1. Since E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), according to formula (8), ∃E ∈
ES (AF), s.t. E1 = E ∩ A⊕u . By α ∈ E1 and E1 ⊆ E , it holds that α ∈ E , i.e., α is accepted w.r.t. E .• If α is rejected w.r.t. E1 (and E ′ , respectively), then ∃β ∈ E1, s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕u . Since E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), according to
formula (8), ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. E1 = E ∩ A⊕u . By β ∈ E1 and E1 ⊆ E , it holds that β ∈ E . Therefore, α is rejected w.r.t. E .• If α is undecided w.r.t. E1 (and E ′ , respectively), then α /∈ E1 and ∀β ∈ E1, (β,α) /∈ R⊕u . Since E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉),
according to formula (8), ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. E1 = E ∩ A⊕u . It follows that α /∈ E . Meanwhile, assume that ∃β ∈ E , s.t.
(β,α) ∈ R . According to the proof of the second item of (⇒), it holds that β ∈ E1 and (β,α) ∈ R⊕u , contradicting
(β,α) /∈ R⊕u . As a result, it holds that α /∈ E and ∀β ∈ E , (β,α) /∈ R . Therefore, α is undecided w.r.t. E . 
Theorem 9. For all α ∈ A⊕a , α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. an extension E2 ∈ ES (CAF1[ E1]) under the
condition A⊕c [E1], in which E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), if and only if α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. an extension
E ′ = E1 ∪ E2 ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉).
Proof. (⇒) Given E2 ∈ ES (CAF1[ E1]), let E ′ = E1 ∪ E2. According to Theorem 4, E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉).
• If α is accepted w.r.t. E2 under the condition A⊕c [E1], then α ∈ E2. It follows that α ∈ E ′ , i.e., α is accepted w.r.t. E ′ .• If α is rejected w.r.t. E2 under the condition A⊕c [E1], then: according to Deﬁnition 14, ∃β ∈ E2, s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕a or∃γ ∈ A⊕c , s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕c and γ is accepted w.r.t. E1. By “∃β ∈ E2, s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕a ”, we have β ∈ E ′ (since E ′ ⊇ E2) and
(β,α) ∈ R⊕ (since R⊕ ⊇ R⊕a ); and by “∃γ ∈ A⊕c , s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕c and γ is accepted w.r.t. E1”, we have γ ∈ E ′ (since
E ′ ⊇ E1 ∩ A⊕c ) and (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕ (since R⊕ ⊇ R⊕c ). So, α is rejected w.r.t. E ′ .• If α is undecided w.r.t. E2 under the condition A⊕c [E1], then: (i) α /∈ E2, (ii) β ∈ E2, s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕a and (iii) γ ∈
A⊕c , s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕c and γ ∈ E1 (according to Deﬁnition 14). First, assume that α ∈ E ′ = E1 ∪ E2. Since α ∈ A⊕a and
A⊕a ∩ A⊕u = ∅, α /∈ E1 ⊆ A⊕u . It follows that α ∈ E2, contradicting “α /∈ E2”. Second, assume that ∃β ∈ E ′ = E1 ∪ E2
s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕ . If β ∈ E1, then there exists an argument in A⊕c , s.t. α is attacked by this argument (since α is only
attacked by the conditioning arguments in A′c ⊆ A′u), contradicting “γ ∈ A⊕c , s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕c and γ ∈ E1”; else, β ∈ E2,
contradicting “β ∈ E2 s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕a ”. So, α is undecided w.r.t. E ′ .
(⇐) Given E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), according to Theorem 6 and formula (14), ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), E2 ∈ ES (CAF1[E1]), s.t., E ′ =
E1 ∪ E2.
• If α is accepted w.r.t. E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), then α ∈ E ′ . Assume that α /∈ E2. Since α ∈ A⊕a and A⊕a ∩ A⊕u = ∅, it holds that
α /∈ E1 ⊆ A⊕u , and therefore α /∈ E ′ , contradicting α ∈ E ′ . So, α is accepted w.r.t. E2.• If α is rejected w.r.t. E ′ , then ∃β ∈ E ′ = E1 ∪ E2, s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕ . If β ∈ E1 ⊆ A⊕u , then it means that α is attacked by a
conditioning argument that is accepted w.r.t. E1 (since α is only attacked by the conditioning arguments in A′c ⊆ A′u);
else, if β ∈ E2 ⊆ A⊕a , then it means that α is attacked by an argument in A⊕a w.r.t. R⊕a . Therefore, α is rejected w.r.t. E2
under the condition A⊕c [E1] (according to Deﬁnition 14).• If α is undecided w.r.t. E ′ , then α /∈ E ′ and ∀β ∈ E ′ , (β,α) /∈ R⊕ . Since α /∈ E ′ , it holds that α /∈ E2. Assume that ∃β ∈ E2,
s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕a . According to the proof of the second item of (⇒), we have β ∈ E ′ and (β,α) ∈ R⊕ , contradicting
“∀β ∈ E ′ , (β,α) /∈ R⊕”. Meanwhile, assume that ∃γ ∈ A⊕c , s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕c and γ is accepted w.r.t. E1. According to the
proof of the second item of (⇒), we have γ ∈ E ′ and (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕ , contradicting “∀β ∈ E ′ , (β,α) /∈ R⊕”. As a result,
it holds that: (i) α /∈ E2, (ii) β ∈ E2 s.t. (β,α) ∈ R⊕a and (iii) γ ∈ A⊕c , s.t. (γ ,α) ∈ R⊕c and γ ∈ E1. Therefore, α is
undecided w.r.t. E2 (according to Deﬁnition 14). 
Meanwhile, as presented in Deﬁnitions 5 and 15, the justiﬁcation state of an argument with respect to a set of extensions
is related to the status of the argument with respect to each extension. So, on the one hand, for the arguments in A⊕u ,
according to Theorem 8, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For all α ∈ A⊕u , α is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible)w.r.t. ES (AF), if and only if α
is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible) w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉) respectively.
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• If α is sceptically justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (AF), then ∀E ∈ ES (AF), α is accepted w.r.t. E .
– Assume that ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), s.t. α is rejected or undecided (i.e., not accepted) w.r.t. E1. According to Theorem 8,
it holds that ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is rejected (respectively, undecided) w.r.t. E , contradicting “∀E ∈ ES (AF), α is accepted
w.r.t. E”. Therefore, ∀E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, α is accepted w.r.t. E1, i.e., α is sceptically justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉).
– Assume that ∃E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), s.t. α is rejected or undecided (i.e., not accepted) w.r.t. E ′ . Let E1 = E ′ ∩ A⊕u . Ac-
cording to Deﬁnition 8, it holds that E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Since α is only attacked or defended by the arguments in
A⊕u , it means that α is rejected or undecided (i.e., not accepted) w.r.t. E1. According to the proof of the previous item,
a contradiction will arise. Therefore, ∀E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), α is accepted w.r.t. E ′ , i.e., α is sceptically justiﬁed w.r.t.
ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉).
• If α is credulously justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (AF), then ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E . According to Theorem 8, it holds
that ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and ∃E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), s.t. E ∩ E ′ ⊇ E1 and α is accepted w.r.t. E1 and E ′ respectively, i.e.,
α is credulously justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉) respectively.
• If α is indefensible w.r.t. ES (AF), then E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E .
– Assume that ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E1. According to Theorem 8, it holds that ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t.
α is accepted w.r.t. E , contradicting “E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E”. Therefore, E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), s.t. α is
accepted w.r.t. E1, i.e., α is indefensible w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉).
– Assume that ∃E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E ′ . Let E1 = E ′ ∩ A⊕u . According to Deﬁnition 8, we have
E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉). Since α ∈ A⊕u and α ∈ E ′ , it holds that α ∈ E1, i.e., α is accepted w.r.t. E1. According to the proof
of the previous item, a contradiction will arise. Therefore, E ′ ∈ ES (〈A⊕, R⊕〉), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E ′ , i.e., α is
indefensible w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉).
(⇐)
• If α is sceptically justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) (and ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉), respectively), then ∀E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), α is accepted
w.r.t. E1. Assume that ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is rejected or undecided (not accepted) w.r.t. E . According to Theorem 8,
it holds that ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), s.t. α is rejected (respectively, undecided) w.r.t. E1. Contradiction. Therefore, ∀E ∈
ES (AF), α is accepted w.r.t. E , i.e., α is sceptically justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (AF).
• If α is credulously justiﬁed w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) (and ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉), respectively), then ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), s.t. α is
accepted w.r.t. E1. According to Theorem 8, ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E , i.e., α is credulously justiﬁed w.r.t.
ES (AF).
• If α is indefensible w.r.t. ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) (and ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉), respectively), then E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), s.t. α is accepted
w.r.t. E1. Assume that ∃E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E . According to Theorem 8, it holds that ∃E1 ∈ ES (〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉),
s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E1. Contradiction. Therefore, E ∈ ES (AF), s.t. α is accepted w.r.t. E , i.e., α is indefensible w.r.t.
ES (AF). 
On the other hand, for the arguments in A⊕a , according to Theorem 9, we have a similar corollary as follows (the proof
of it is omitted).
Corollary 4. For all α ∈ A⊕a , α is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible) w.r.t.⋃
E1∈ES (〈A⊕u ,R⊕u 〉) ES ( CAF1[E1]), if and only if α is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible) w.r.t.
ES (〈A⊕ , R⊕〉).
Second, in the case of a deletion to an argumentation framework, we have the following theorems and corollaries. The
proofs of them are similar to those of Theorems 8 and 9, and Corollaries 3 and 4, respectively, and therefore omitted.
Theorem 10. For all α ∈ Au , α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. an extension E ∈ ES (AF), if and only if
∃E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉) and ∃E ′ ∈ ES (〈A, R〉), s.t. E ∩ E ′ ⊇ E1 and α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided)w.r.t. E1 and
E ′ respectively.
Theorem 11. For all α ∈ Aa , α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. an extension E2 ∈ ES (CAF2[ E1]) under the
condition Ac [E1], in which E1 ∈ ES (〈Au , Ru 〉), if and only if α is accepted (respectively, rejected and undecided) w.r.t. an extension
E ′ = E1 ∪ E2 ∈ ES (〈A, R〉).
Corollary 5. For all α ∈ Au , α is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible)w.r.t. ES (AF), if and only if α
is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible) w.r.t. ES (〈Au , Ru 〉) and ES (〈A , R〉) respectively.
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Corollary 6. For all α ∈ Aa , α is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible) w.r.t.⋃
E1∈ES (〈Au ,Ru 〉) ES ( CAF2[E1]), if and only if α is sceptically justiﬁed (respectively, credulously justiﬁed and indefensible) w.r.t.
ES (〈A , R〉).
In this section, we have formulated in detail how to compute the extensions of the two kinds of sub-frameworks and
combine them to form the extensions of the updated argumentation framework. We have proved that the semantics com-
bination is both sound and complete. Meanwhile, we have also proved the correctness of the status evolution of arguments
by using the division-based method.
4.3.3. An illustrating example
Finally, in the end of this section, we will use an example to further illustrate the process of computing the extensions
of an updated argumentation framework based on the division, as well as the properties of the division-based method. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we only discuss the case under preferred semantics.
Example 6 (Continue Example 5). The set of extensions of AF under preferred semantics is: EPR(AF) = {E0,1, E0,2,
E0,3, E0,4, E0,5, E0,6, E0.7, E0,8}, in which E0,1 = {α1,α4,α5,α7}, E0,2 = {α1,α4,α5,α8}, E0,3 = {α1,α4,α6,α7}, E0,4 =
{α1,α4,α6,α8}, E0,5 = {α2,α4,α5,α7}, E0,6 = {α2,α4,α5,α8}, E0,7 = {α2,α4,α6,α7}, and E0,8 = {α2,α4,α6,α8}.
First, according to formula (8), the extensions of 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉 under preferred semantics are directly computed:
EPR
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉)= {E ∩ A⊕u
∣∣ E ∈ {E0,1, E0,2, . . . , E0,8}
}= {E1,1, E1,2}, in which
E1,1 = {α1,α4}, and E1,2 = {α2,α4}
Second, get a set of assigned CAFs according to conditioning arguments A⊕c with different statuses. According to for-
mula (12), we have A⊕c [E1,1] = ({α4}, {α2},∅) and A⊕c [E1,2] = ({α2,α4},∅,∅). So, there are two different assigned CAFs
(Fig. 4):
CAF1[E1,1] =
(({α5,α6,α7,α8,α9,α10},
{
(α5,α6), (α6,α5), (α7,α8), (α8,α7), (α5,α10), (α9,α10), (α10,α7)
})
,
(({α4}, {α2},∅
)
,
{
(α2,α5), (α4,α9)
}))
CAF1[E1,2] =
(({α5,α6,α7,α8,α9,α10},
{
(α5,α6), (α6,α5), (α7,α8), (α8,α7), (α5,α10), (α9,α10), (α10,α7)
})
,
(({α2,α4},∅,∅
)
,
{
(α2,α5), (α4,α9)
}))
Third, compute the extensions of the assigned CAFs (please refer to Example 4 for the discussion about the acceptability
of arguments in each assigned CAF):
EPR
(
CAF1[E1,1]
)= {E2,1, E2,2, E2,3}, in which
E2,1 = {α5,α7}, E2,2 = {α5,α8}, and E2,3 = {α6,α8,α10}
EPR
(
CAF1[E1,2]
)= {E2,4}, in which E2,4 = {α6,α8,α10}
Fourth, compute the results of combining the extensions of two kinds of sub-frameworks:
CombExtPR
(〈
A⊕, R⊕
〉)= {E1 ∪ E2
∣∣ E1 ∈ EPR
(〈
A⊕u , R⊕u
〉)∧ E2 ∈ EPR
(
CAF1[E1]
)}
= {E1,1 ∪ E2,1, E1,1 ∪ E2,2, E1,1 ∪ E2,3, E1,2 ∪ E2,4}
= {{α1,α4,α5,α7}, {α1,α4,α5,α8}, {α1,α4,α6,α8,α10}, {α2,α4,α6,α8,α10}
}
Here, we may verify that E1,1 ∪ E2,1, E1,1 ∪ E2,2, E1,1 ∪ E2,3, and E1,2 ∪ E2,4 are preferred extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉. Take
E1,1 ∪ E2,3 = {α1,α4,α6,α8,α10} for example. It holds that: (1) E1,1 ∪ E2,3 ⊆ A ∪ B . (2) E1,1 ∪ E2,3 is conﬂict-free. (3) Every
argument in E1,1 ∪ E2,3 is acceptable w.r.t. E1,1 ∪ E2,3: α1 is attacked by α2, which is defeated by α1 ∈ E1,1 ⊆ E1,1 ∪ E2,3;
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E1,1 ∪ E2,3; α8 is attacked by α7, which is defeated by α10 ∈ E2,3 ⊆ E1,1 ∪ E2,3; α10 is attacked by α5 and α9, in which
α5 is defeated by α6 ∈ E2,3 ⊆ E1,1 ∪ E2,3 and α9 is defeated by α4 ∈ A⊕c ∩ E1,1 = {α4} ⊆ E1,1 ∪ E2,3. (4) Every argument in
A ∪ B that is acceptable w.r.t. E1,1 ∪ E2,3 is in E1,1 ∪ E2,3: every argument in (A ∪ B) \ (E1,1 ∪ E2,3) = {α2,α3,α5,α7,α9} is
not acceptable w.r.t. E1,1 ∪ E2,3. (5) E1,1 ∪ E2,3 is maximal.
On the other hand, if we directly compute the preferred extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉, then we have EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉) = {E ′0,1,
E ′0,2, E ′0,3, E ′0,4} = {{α1,α4,α5,α7}, {α1,α4,α5,α8}, {α1,α4,α6,α8,α10}, {α2,α4,α6,α8,α10}}. For every extension E ′0,i (i =
1,2,3,4) in EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉), there are a corresponding extension E1, j = E ′0,i ∩ A⊕u ( j = 1,2) in EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉) and a
corresponding extension E2,k ∩ A⊕a (k = 1,2,3,4) in EPR(CAF1[E1, j]), s.t. E ′0,i = E1, j ∪ E2,k . For example, as to E ′0,1 =
{α1,α4,α5,α7}, we have E ′0,1 ∩ A⊕u = {α1,α4} = E1,1 and E ′0,1 ∩ A⊕a = {α5,α7} = E2,1. It is obvious that E ′0,1 = E1,1 ∪ E2,1.
Finally, let us discuss the status evolution of arguments by using the division-based method. On the one hand, as to each
argument in A⊕u = {α1,α2,α3,α4}, its status w.r.t. each preferred extension of AF is the same as the one w.r.t. a related
preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉; meanwhile, its justiﬁcation state w.r.t. the set of preferred extensions of AF is the same as
the one w.r.t. the set of preferred extensions of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉.
• As far as the status of an argument w.r.t. a speciﬁc extension is concerned, take α1 and E0,1 = {α1,α4,α5, α7} as an
example. Since α1 ∈ E0,1, α1 is accepted w.r.t. E0,1. Since E1,1 = E0,1 ∩ A⊕u , and α1 ∈ E1,1, α1 is accepted w.r.t. E1,1.
Since E ′0,1 = E1,1 ∪ E2,1 and α1 ∈ E ′0,1, α1 is accepted w.r.t. E ′0,1. Therefore, the status of α1 w.r.t. E0,1 is the same as
the one w.r.t. E1,1 and E ′0,1 respectively.• As far as the justiﬁcation state of an argument w.r.t. the set of extensions is concerned, take α4 as an example. Since
α4 is in every preferred extension of AF , α4 is skeptically justiﬁed w.r.t. EPR(AF). Meanwhile, since α4 is in every
preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉 (and 〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉, respectively), α4 is skeptically justiﬁed w.r.t. EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉) (and
EPR(〈A⊕u , R⊕u 〉), respectively).
On the other hand, as to each argument in A⊕a = {α5,α6,α7,α8,α9,α10}, its status w.r.t. each preferred extension of an
assigned CAF is the same as the one w.r.t. a related preferred extension of 〈A⊕, R⊕〉; meanwhile, its justiﬁcation state w.r.t.
sets of preferred extensions of a set of assigned CAFs is also the same as the one w.r.t. the set of preferred extensions of
〈A⊕, R⊕〉.
• As far as the status of an argument w.r.t. a speciﬁc extension is concerned, take α8 and E2,2 = {α5,α8} ∈
EPR(CAF1[E1,1]) as an example. Since α8 ∈ E2,2, α8 is accepted w.r.t. E2,2. Meanwhile, since E ′0,2 = E1,1 ∪ E2,2 ∈
EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉) and α8 ∈ E ′0,2, α8 is accepted w.r.t. E ′0,2. Therefore, the status of α8 w.r.t. E2,2 is the same as the one
w.r.t. E ′0,2.• As far as the justiﬁcation state of an argument w.r.t. the set of extensions is concerned, take α8 as an example. Since
α8 is accepted w.r.t. E2,2, E2,3, and E2,4 respectively, but is rejected w.r.t. E2,1, it holds that α8 is credulously justiﬁed
w.r.t. EPR(CAF1[E1,1]) ∪ EPR(CAF1[E1,2]). Meanwhile, since α8 is accepted w.r.t. E ′0,2, E ′0,3, and E ′0,4 respectively, but
is rejected w.r.t. E ′0,1, it holds that α8 is credulously justiﬁed w.r.t. EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉). Therefore, the justiﬁcation state of
α8 w.r.t. EPR(CAF1[E1,1]) ∪ EPR(CAF1[E1,2]) is the same as the one w.r.t. EPR(〈A⊕, R⊕〉).
5. Conclusions and future work
5.1. The main contributions of this paper
The changing of arguments and attacks is a very common property of various kinds of argumentation systems. However,
as Dunne and Wooldridge pointed out that “. . . , the treatment of algorithms and complexity issues relating to determining argu-
ment status in dynamically changing environments has been somewhat neglected” [37], unlike other aspects of argumentation in
artiﬁcial intelligence that have been extensively studied, very little attention has been paid to the dynamics of argumenta-
tion. So, it is very important to further explore this subject. Motivated by this idea, we have proposed an original approach
in this paper to cope with one of the challenging problems of the dynamics of argumentation: how to eﬃciently compute
the status of arguments in an argumentation system, upon the changing of arguments and attacks. The contributions of this
paper mainly include the following aspects:
1. Propose a method to divide an argumentation framework: by taking advantage of the characteristics of the relationship
between the status of arguments and their attack relation, we have formally described a method for dividing an argu-
mentation framework and proved the correctness of this division.
2. Propose a method to compute the status of affected arguments: we have introduce two new concepts, conditioned argumen-
tation framework (CAF) and assigned CAFs, as well as the semantics of an assigned CAF, based on which the status of
affected arguments can be computed correctly.
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combination of the two kinds of sub-frameworks, and proved the soundness and completeness of the combination.
Meanwhile, we have proved the correctness of status evolution of arguments by using the division-based method.
With the above contributions, the division-based method proposed in this paper has the following characteristics:
1. Generality: It is a general theory in the sense of the following two aspects. First, this theory is applicable to various kinds
of argumentation semantics that satisfy the directionality criterion, including complete semantics, preferred semantics,
grounded semantics, and ideal semantics, etc. Second, this theory is able to treat with a general form of dynamics of
argumentation, i.e., (i) the number of arguments and attacks to be added to or deleted from an argumentation system
is unlimited; and (ii) both the addition and the deletion of arguments and/or attacks are applicable.
2. Eﬃciency: Qualitatively, it is obvious that in most cases (although not in all cases) the division-based method is more
eﬃcient. This is mainly due to the following two reasons. First, there exist linear time algorithms for the division of
an argumentation framework (in that the problem of dividing an argumentation framework corresponds to ﬁnding
the nodes reachable from a set of nodes in a directed graph). Second, when computing the extensions of a modiﬁed
argumentation framework, we may reuse some previous computation, rather than simply recompute the status of each
argument afresh.
With the above two characteristics, this theory is expected to be very useful in various kinds of argumentation-based
systems, especially belief revision [40,19,20,61,42], deliberation [2,54,44], decision-making [46,43,6,51], and negotiation [57,
47,1,59,4], within agents and multi-agent systems. The reason is that in these systems, underlying knowledge and informa-
tion are often uncertain, incomplete, inconsistent, and ever-changing. As a result, the corresponding argumentation systems
are dynamic by nature. So, the eﬃcient division-based method will facilitate the development of these systems.
5.2. Related work
In recent years, dynamics of argumentation has attracted some research efforts. However, up to now, its concept is still
unclear. Different researchers treated with it from different perspectives.
First, in the area of dialectical argumentation, the dynamics of argumentation means that the dialectical process of
argumentation may change with the variations of knowledge at different stages [21,58,56]. This concept focuses on how a
position (or a claim) can be proved with respect to a theory which can be revised dynamically. Researchers in this area did
not care about the status evolution of the whole set of arguments within an argumentation framework, but only considered
whether a speciﬁc position (or a claim) is acceptable according to a dialectical proof procedure where two parties (proposer
and opposer) are involved.
Second, other researchers paid more attention to how the whole set of arguments and attacks of an argumentation
system changes with the changing of underlying information, or how the status of arguments of an argumentation system
evolves upon the changing of arguments and attacks. On the one hand, in [20], Capobianco et al. used potential argu-
ments and the instances of them to treat with the knowledge changing in dynamic environment. When perceptions change
dynamically, the instances of potential arguments and attacks among them vary accordingly. As a result, the status of argu-
ments is changed. Sharing some basic ideas with [20], Rotstein et al. introduced the notion of dynamics into the concept
of abstract argumentation frameworks, by including the concept of evidence [61]. They proposed a concept of Dynamic
Argumentation Framework (corresponding to potential arguments in [20]), from which a static instance can be obtained, ac-
cording to a varying set of evidence (corresponding to perceptions in [20]). However, both of them have not considered how
to dynamically compute the status of arguments without computing the whole set of arguments in each time point. On
the other hand, some researchers have performed some works towards this issue. For example, Moguillansky et al. studied
the dynamics of argumentation based on the idea of classical belief revision, i.e., when an argument is added to a system,
the revision operator will change the set of arguments, with an objective that the newly added argument is accepted [55].
Boella et al. studied the dynamics of argumentation by exploring the principles where the extension does not change when
an argument or an attack between them is changed, but without considering how to dynamically compute the status of
arguments when the status of existing arguments is affected [13,14]. Baroni et al. proposed a notion of directionality, which
says that unattacked sets are unaffected by the remaining part of the argumentation framework as far as extensions are
concerned [8,9], but without considering the dynamics of argumentation systems. Cayrol et al. explored the impact of the
arrival of a new argument on the outcome of an argumentation framework, by deﬁning a typology of reﬁnement (i.e. adding
an argument), and deﬁning principles and condition so that each type of reﬁnement becomes a classical revision [23]. How-
ever, they did not focus on how to compute the status of arguments when an argumentation framework is expanded with
a set of arguments or attacks. Amgoud et al. studied how the acceptability of arguments evolves when the decision system
is extended by new arguments without computing the whole extensions [5]. Their theory is focused on the revision of a
particular argument (a practical argument or an epistemic argument). On the contrary, we are more interested in the issue
of how the status of all arguments in an argumentation framework changes when any variations arise.
Based on the above analysis, we may conclude that this paper is in line with [8,23,13] and [5], etc., but has the two
characteristics (generality and eﬃciency) mentioned above.
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to form the uniﬁed extensions of the whole argumentation framework is related to the work presented in [27]. According
to [27], given a set of distinct argumentation frameworks from different agents, they are expanded respectively into partial
systems over the set of all arguments considered by the group of agents. Then, a merging operator is used to produce a set
of argumentation systems that are as close as possible to the partial systems (to realize a kind of consensus). And then, the
acceptability of a set of arguments at the group level is obtained by selecting the extensions of a set of produced (merged)
argumentation frameworks at the local level. With some sense of similarity, in our division-based method, each extension
of the whole argumentation framework can also be regarded as a kind of the uniﬁed consensus of the extensions of two sub-
frameworks. However, since the sub-frameworks in the division-based method are parts of an argumentation framework,
although the extensions of each sub-framework are computed locally (associated by the conditioning arguments), they
are parts of the extensions of the whole argumentation framework, and therefore there are no conﬂicts between each
extension of the unaffected sub-framework and the extensions of corresponding assigned CAF. So, the extensions of the
whole argumentation framework is obtained by combining the extensions of the two sub-frameworks (rather than selecting
the extensions of the two sub-frameworks).
5.3. Future work
First, as mentioned in Section 1, beside grounded semantics, complete semantics, preferred semantics, and ideal se-
mantics, some other semantics including CF2 and the prudent version of grounded semantics also satisfy the directionality
criterion. However, since CF2 is based on the SCC-recursive scheme [8], and the prudent version of grounded semantics
is based on the notion of prudently conﬂict-free set [26], the division-based method proposed in this paper should be
specialized (or modiﬁed) to meet the characteristics of these semantics.
Second, based on the theory formulated in this paper, it is worth investigating the development of speciﬁc algorithms
for computing the extensions of argumentation frameworks under various semantics, as well as their detailed complexities
(formal analysis or practical experiment). In recent years, some proof theories and algorithms for abstract argumentation
frameworks have been proposed [22,18,33,34,63,53], but they are mainly related to static systems [37]. So, it would be
interesting to combine the division-based method with the existing proof theories and algorithms to realize the dynamics of
argumentation. Meanwhile, it is also important to study the worst-case (algorithm independent) computational complexity
of this method.
Third, as mentioned in Section 1, the changing of arguments and attacks among them is an intrinsic property of a
variety of argumentation systems. Based on the method proposed in this paper, the next step is to study the dynamics
of these concrete systems, including belief revision, deliberation, decision-making, and negotiation, etc., within agents and
multi-agent systems [60].
Finally, the division-based method can also be applied to computing the extensions of a static argumentation framework,
which is a part of our on-going work.
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